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Abstract
We show that posted prices are the optimal mechanism to sell a durable
good to a privately informed buyer when the seller has limited commitment
in an infinite horizon setting. We provide a methodology for mechanism de-
sign with limited commitment and transferable utility. Whereas in the case of
commitment, subject to the buyer’s truthtelling and participation constraints,
the seller’s problem is a decision problem, in the case of limited commitment,
the seller’s problem corresponds to an intrapersonal game, where different
“incarnations” of the seller represent the different beliefs he may have about
the buyer’s valuation.
KEYWORDS: mechanism design, limited commitment, intrapersonal equilibrium,
information design, self-generation, posted price
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D84, D86
∗We would like to thank Rahul Deb, Frederic Koessler, Pablo Schenone, and especially Max
Stinchcombe, as well as audiences at Cowles, SITE, and Stony Brook, for thought-provoking
questions and illuminating discussions. Vasiliki Skreta is grateful for generous financial support
through the ERC consolidator grant 682417 “Frontiers in design.” This research was supported by
grants from the National Science Foundation (SES-1851744 and SES-1851729).
†California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125. E-mail: ldoval@caltech.edu
‡University of Texas at Austin, University College London, and CEPR. E-mail:
vskreta@gmail.com
1
1 Introduction
A classic problem in mechanism design is how to sell a good to a buyer so as to
maximize the seller’s revenue. The answer is surprisingly simple: out of the many
ways in which a seller could achieve this feat, a posted price is optimal. This
result does not depend on the length of the interaction between the buyer and
the seller: even if they would interact for infinitely many periods, the revenue-
maximizing mechanism is to post the same price in each period. An important
assumption behind this result is that the seller can commit to the whole sequence
of mechanisms that the buyer faces. The commitment assumption is important
because the optimal mechanism is, in general, time-inconsistent. When the buyer
does not buy the good at the posted price, the seller has to be able to not lower the
price even if there is common knowledge of unrealized gains from trade.
However, much less is known about how to sell a durable good when the seller
can commit to today’s mechanism, but not to themechanism hewill offer if no sale
occurs. In an infinite horizon game in which the seller may only post a price in
each period, Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) show the seller can achieve monopoly
profits provided that (i) the buyer’s valuation is drawn from a continuum, with
the lowest valuation being smaller than the seller’s marginal cost (i.e., the no gap
case), and (ii) we consider the limit case in which the seller is fully patient. In
a finite horizon game in which the seller can choose mechanisms in each period
and the buyer’s valuation is drawn from a continuum, Skreta (2006) shows the
seller’s optimal mechanism under limited commitment is a sequence of posted
prices. These results rely, however, on the assumption that the seller directly ob-
serves the buyer’s choices – the rejection of the price in Ausubel and Deneckere
(1989) and the choice of messages in Skreta (2006) . Indeed, in a two-period model,
Denicolo and Garella (1999) show that when the seller only observes whether trade
happens or not, the seller may instead prefer to ration high valuation buyers in the
first period, in order to induce a strong demand in the second period.
In this paper, we study an infinite-horizon mechanism-selection game between an
uninformed seller, who owns one unit of a durable good, and a privately informed
buyer. The buyer’s valuation is binary and fully persistent. At the beginning of
each period, as long as the good has not been sold, the seller offers the buyer a
mechanism, the rules of which determine the allocation for that period. Following
Bester and Strausz (2007) and Doval and Skreta (2018), the set of mechanisms the
seller may choose from allows the seller to design how much he observes about
the buyer’s choices, and hence, design his beliefs about the buyer’s type. Since
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the sellers beliefs define the demand schedule he faces, it is feasible for him to
implement, amongst others, the demand schedule that obtains from rationing in
Denicolo and Garella (1999).
The main result of this paper is that, among all mechanisms, posted prices
are optimal when the seller has limited commitment. Theorem 1 characterizes
the revenue-maximizing Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and a strategy profile that
achieves it. The latter is such that, as long as a sale has not occurred, the seller will
choose a mechanism that can be implemented as a posted price. Contrary to the
case in which the seller has commitment to the entire sequence of mechanisms, the
sequence of posted prices is not constant, reflecting the fact that the seller makes
inferences about the buyer’s valuation in the event that no trade happens.
The optimality of posted prices echoes the result for the case in which the seller
has commitment, showing that the shape of the mechanism does not depend on
whether there is commitment to short- or long-term mechanisms. Moreover, this
result provides a microfoundation for the strategy space used by the literature
that studies the sale of a durable good by a monopolist. Inasmuch as we are
interested in understanding the best outcome for the monopolist, assuming he
can post prices is without loss of generality.
The key conceptual innovation of the analysis is to translate the problem of find-
ing the revenue-maximizing PBE in the mechanism-selection game between the
seller and the buyer into an auxiliary problem, which only involves the seller. This
auxiliary problem is an intrapersonal game, where the seller is the only player, and
each of his “incarnations” represents the different beliefs he may have about the
buyer’s valuation. This step establishes a formal connection between the liter-
atures on mechanism design with limited commitment and that on time incon-
sistency. Time inconsistency of optimal mechanisms under full commitment lies
at the heart of the difficulties in mechanism design with limited commitment
(Laffont and Tirole (1990)). This paper is the first to show that these two prob-
lems, mechanism design with limited commitment and intrapersonal games, are
formally related and to use the solution of one to solve the other.
To understand how we arrive to this auxiliary problem, a review of the four
main steps involved in the proof of Theorem 1 is useful (We contrast our ap-
proach to previous work on mechanism design with limited commitment, espe-
cially Skreta (2006) in the related literature). First, we rely on the results in our
previous work, Doval and Skreta (2018), to simplify the class of mechanisms the
seller will offer in any equilibrium of the game and, more importantly, the buyer’s
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equilibrium behavior. This step reduces the search of the optimal sequence of
mechanisms to those that satisfy, loosely speaking, a sequence of participation and
truthtelling constraints. Second, we derive necessary conditions that a revenue-
maximizing PBE assessment must satisfy. These necessary conditions are the dy-
namic analogue of establishing which participation and incentive compatibility
constraints are binding in the case of commitment. We use these conditions to ob-
tain a recursive program which provides an upper bound on the seller’s payoff in
the payoff-maximizing PBE, analogous to the maximization of the virtual surplus
in the case of commitment. Indeed, as in the case of commitment, in this recursive
program, the seller’s payoff is written solely as a function of the allocation: the
transfers have been removed by using the binding constraints.
The third step shows this recursive program has a unique solution. Whereas
in the case of commitment the maximization of the virtual surplus is a decision
problem, it corresponds to an intrapersonal game in the case of limited commitment.
Indeed, the best response condition of the intrapersonal equilibrium captures the
restrictions imposed by sequential rationality on the seller’s behavior. Whenever
the seller chooses an allocation that involves no trade, he internalizes how his
beliefs will change and how that change will determine the choice of mechanisms
in the continuation.
The output of this third step is a mapping that assigns a choice of a mecha-
nism to each belief the seller may hold about the buyer’s valuation. The final step
is to return to our dynamic incomplete information game and show how to use
this mapping to construct the revenue-maximizing PBE assessment. Crucial to
this step is a result in our previous work that allows us to apply self-generation
techniques as in Abreu et al. (1990); Athey and Bagwell (2008) to characterize the
whole set of equilibrium payoffs.
Notwithstanding the conceptual contributions of the analysis, our work also
makes a methodological contribution in that it provides a recipe for analyzing
mechanism design problems with limited commitment with transferable utility.
Indeed, the four steps we described above follow very closely the prototypical
steps in classical mechanism design: (i) invoke the revelation principle to simplify
the class of mechanisms and the agent’s behavior, (ii) find the binding constraints,
(iii) maximize the virtual surplus, and (iv) show the solution satisfies any con-
straints that may have been ignored. As will become clear from the analysis that
follows, these four steps will also be necessary in other problems of mechanism
design with limited commitment and transferable utility beyond the one we con-
sider here.
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Our goal is to highlight the conceptual and technical nuances that arise in an
infinite-horizon mechanism selection game when the designer has limited commit-
ment, and thus our focus on the case of binary valuations. This allows us to bring
to the forefront the complexities that arise because of the designer’s rich action
space. The extension to the case in which the buyer’s valuation is drawn from a
continuum is of interest, and we plan to address it in future work. When possible,
we highlight in footnotes how the results presented extend to the continuum.
Related Literature: The paper contributes mainly to four strands of literature.
The first strand, similar to this paper, derives optimal mechanisms when the de-
signer has limited commitment, but unlike this paper, these studies consider finite
horizon settings (see Laffont and Tirole (1988); Skreta (2006, 2015); Deb and Said
(2015); Fiocco and Strausz (2015); Beccuti and Mo¨ller (2018)). In these papers, the
observability of the agent’s choices in the mechanismmakes it hard to disentangle
the principal’s choice of mechanism from the agent’s best response, which deter-
mines, in turn, the principal’s continuation beliefs, and hence, his continuation
payoffs. In their seminal paper, to get around this difficulty, Bester and Strausz
(2001) allow the agent to misrepresent her type with positive probability. Instead,
Skreta (2006) circumvents the same problem by leveraging the properties of the
set of incentive feasible outcomes and the finite horizon, which pins down the
optimal mechanism in the final period, to study the implications of the seller’s
sequential rationality constraints for the set of incentive feasible outcomes.
Our approach allows us to reduce the seller’s search for the optimum to a set
of mechanisms that satisfy the truthtelling and participation constraints of the
buyer, without having to impose any restrictions on the horizon of the game. This
simplifies the analysis by allowing us, for the most part, to ignore the buyer as
a player. This approach relies on endowing the seller with a larger set of mech-
anisms, which comes “at the cost” of having to rule out as optimal a richer set
of possibilities. As we discuss Section 3.2, the richer set of mechanisms and no
exogenous deadline on the interaction between the seller and the buyer, make the
analysis differ from the case in which the horizon is finite.
The second strand, similar to this paper, studies infinite horizon problems in
which the designer has limited commitment and faces an agent with one of finitely
many types.1 Given the difficulties with the revelation principle when the de-
1Beccuti and Mo¨ller (2018) lie somewhat in between these two strands because they take limits
of their finite horizon results to draw conclusions about the infinite horizon setting. However,
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signer has limited commitment (Laffont and Tirole (1988); Bester and Strausz (2001)),
the works on this second strand either impose restrictions on the class of con-
tracts that can be offered (e.g., Strulovici (2017); Gerardi and Maestri (2018)), or
on the solution concept (e.g., Acharya and Ortner (2017)). This paper contributes
to the literature in two ways. First, by appealing to the results in Doval and Skreta
(2018), we avoid imposing restrictions on the length of the interaction, the class of
mechanisms, and the solution concept. Second, whereas we exploit the specifics
of our problem to show equilibrium existence, the methodology suggested by the
paper can be imported into other settings of interest and, as we discuss through-
out the paper, it can be particularly powerful in the case of transferable utility.
The third strand is the literature that starts with the observation in Coase (1972)
that the durable-good monopolist faces a time-inconsistency problem, which in
turn limits his monopoly power. The papers in the durable-good monopolist lit-
erature (Stokey (1981); Bulow (1982); Gul et al. (1986); Sobel (1991); Ortner (2017))
study price dynamics2 and establish (under some conditions) Coase’s conjecture.3
Related to this literature is the problem of dynamic bargaining with one-sided in-
complete information, where an uninformed proposer each period makes a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to a privately informed receiver.4 Sobel and Takahashi (1983),
Fudenberg et al. (1985), and Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) characterize the equi-
libria of this game for the case of finite horizon, infinite horizon and gap, infinite
horizon and no gap, respectively. In an analogous vein, Burguet and Sakovics
(1996), McAfee and Vincent (1997), Caillaud and Mezzetti (2004), and Liu et al.
(2019) study equilibrium reserve-price dynamics without commitment in differ-
ent settings.5 The common thread in all these papers is that the seller’s inability
to commit reduces monopoly profits.
The last strand is the literature on games with time-inconsistent preferences,
which builds on the seminal works of Strotz (1955), Peleg and Yaari (1973), and
they do not show that this limit corresponds to the seller’s revenue-maximizing equilibrium in the
infinite horizon game.
2Even when the seller can commit not to revise prices, price dynamics can arise if there are
demand or cost changes. See, for example, Stokey (1979), Conlisk et al. (1984), and Garrett (2016).
3There is also a literature that analyzes different variations on the sale of a durable good model
to understand whether Coase’s conjecture still obtains. See, for instance, McAfee and Wiseman
(2008); Board and Pycia (2014).
4More recently, Peski (2019) studies alternating bargaining games where players can offer
menus.
5Dilme´ and Li (Forthcoming) study revenue management when the seller cannot commit to
revise prices.
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Pollak (1968). Our contribution to this literature is to show that optimal mecha-
nisms under limited commitment can be obtained as a solution to an intrapersonal
game, even when both the seller and the buyer have time consistent preferences.
In this way, we extend the range of applications of this literature, which has al-
ready seen applications ranging from growth and development (Bernheim et al.
(2015)) to saving decisions (Harris and Laibson (2001)).
Organization The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the model; Section 2.1 summarizes the results in Doval and Skreta (2018) used to
simplify the analysis that follows. Section 3 formally states themain result and de-
scribes the main steps in the proof of Theorem 1. Section 3.1 derives the recursive
formulation that is the basis of the intrapersonal game; Section 3.2 characterizes
the unique equilibrium of the intrapersonal game; Section 3.3 uses the intraper-
sonal equilibrium to build a PBE assessment that delivers the revenue-maximizing
PBE. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
Primitives: Two players, a seller and a buyer, interact over infinitely many pe-
riods. The seller owns one unit of a durable good to which he attaches value 0.
The buyer has private information: before her interaction with the seller starts,
she observes her valuation v ∈ {vL, vH} ≡ V, with 0 ≤ vL < vH . Let µ0 denote
the probability that the buyer’s valuation is vH at the beginning of the game. In
what follows, we denote by ∆(V) the set of distributions on V.
An allocation in period t is a pair (q, x) ∈ {0, 1} ×R, where q indicates whether
the good is traded (q = 1) or not (q = 0), and x is a payment from the buyer to the
seller. The game ends the first time the good is traded.
Payoffs are as follows. If in period t, the allocation is (q, x), the flow payoffs are
uB(q, x, v) = vq− x and uS(q, x) = x for the buyer and the seller, respectively. The
seller and the buyer maximize the expected discounted sum of flow payoffs. They
share a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Mechanisms: To introduce the timing of the game, we first define the action
space of the seller in each period. In each period, the seller offers the buyer amech-
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anism. Following Myerson (1982); Bester and Strausz (2007); Doval and Skreta
(2018), we define amechanism as follows. Amechanism,M = 〈(MM, βM, SM), (qM, xM)〉,
consists of a communication device βM, which maps an input message m ∈ MM
to a distribution with finite support on SM, and an allocation rule (qM, xM), which
maps each element s in SM to a probability of trade, qM(µ′), and a payment from
the buyer to the seller, xM(µ′).6 We endow the seller with a collection (Mi, Si)i∈I
of input and output messages in which each Mi is finite, contains at least two ele-
ments, and each Si contains ∆(Mi). Denote byM. the set of all mechanisms with
message sets (Mi, Si)i∈I .
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Timing: If in period t, the good is yet to be traded, then
t. 0 Both players observe a draw from a public randomization device ω ∈ [0, 1].8
t. 1 The seller offers the buyer a mechanismM = (〈MM, βM, SM, 〉, (qM, xM)).
t. 2 The buyer observes the mechanism and decides to participate (p = 1) or not
(p = 0).
t. 2.1 If the buyer does not participate in the mechanism, the good is not sold
and no payments are made; that is, the allocation is (q, x) = (0, 0).
t. 2.2 If the buyer participates in the mechanism,
i. She chooses a report m ∈ MM, which is unobserved by the seller,
ii. An output message s ∈ SM is drawn from βM(·|m), which, in turn,
determines the probability of trade qM(s), and the payment, xM(s).
The output message and the allocation are observed by both the seller
and the buyer. If the good is not traded, the game proceeds to period
t+ 1.
6A priori, we could have allowed a mechanism to offer a randomization over allocations, i.e. a
randomization over {0, 1}×R. However, because both players have quasilinear payoffs, the seller
does not benefit from randomizing over transfers (see Lemma II.1 in Doval and Skreta (2019) for a
proof). He may, however, benefit from randomizing over whether the good is traded.
7We restrict the seller to choose mechanisms with input and output messages in (Mi, Si)i∈I to
have a well-defined action space for the seller. This allows us to have a well-defined set of devia-
tions, avoiding set-theoretic issues related to self-referential sets. The analysis in Doval and Skreta
(2018) shows that the choice of the collection plays no further role in the analysis.
8Public randomization devices are standard in repeated games (see, e.g.,
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)).
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The above description determines an infinite horizon dynamic game, which we
denote by G∞M(µ0) to remind the reader that the seller’s beliefs at the beginning
of the game are given by µ0. Public histories in this game are
ht = (ω0,M0, p0, s0, (q0, x0), . . . ,ωt−1,Mt−1, pt−1, st−1, (qt−1, xt−1),ωt),
where pk ∈ {0, 1} denotes the buyer’s participation decision, with the restriction
that if pk = 0, then sk = ∅, i.e., no signal is generated, and (qk, xk) = (0, 0).
9 Let Ht
denote the set of all period t public histories; they capture what the seller knows
through period t. A strategy for the seller is then Γ : ∪∞t=0H
t 7→ ∆(MC).
A history for the buyer consists of the public history of the game together with
the buyer’s reports into the mechanism (henceforth, the buyer history) and her
private information. Formally, a buyer history is an element
htB = (ω0,M0, p0,m0, s0, (q0, x0), . . . ,ωt−1,Mt−1, pt−1,mt−1, st−1, (qt−1, xt−1),ωt).
Let HtB denote the set of buyer histories through period t. The buyer also knows
her valuation and hence, when her valuation is v, a history through period t is an
element of {v} × HtB. The buyer’s participation strategy is πv : ∪
∞
t=0(H
t
B ×M) 7→
[0, 1]. Conditional on participating in the mechanismM, her reporting strategy is
a distribution rv(htB,M, 1) ∈ ∆(M
M) for each of her types v and each htB ∈ H
t
B.
A belief for the seller at the beginning of time t, history ht, is a distribution
µ(ht) ∈ ∆(V × HtB(h
t)), where HtB(h
t) is the set of buyer histories consistent with
the public history, ht.
Solution concept: We are interested in studying the Perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium (henceforth, PBE) payoffs of this game, where PBE is defined as follows. An
assessment, 〈Γ, (πv , rv)v∈V , µ〉, is a PBE if the following hold:
1. Given µ(ht), Γ(ht) is sequentially rational given (πv, rv)v∈V ,
2. Given Γ(ht), πv(h
t
B, ·), rv(h
t
B, ·, 1) are sequentially rational for all h
t
B ∈ H
t
B
and v ∈ V,
3. µ(ht) is derived via Bayes’ rule where possible (see Definition 4 in Section A.1).10
9While there is no output message when the buyer does not participate in the mechanism, we
denote this by s = ∅ to keep the length of all histories the same.
10Section A.1 contains the formal statement of Bayes’ rule where possible. To wit, we impose the
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We denote by E∗M(µ0) ⊆ R
3 the set of PBE payoffs of G∞M(µ0) and we use
(uS, uH , uL) to denote a generic element of E
∗
M(µ0), where uS is the seller’s payoff
and uH, uL denote the buyer’s payoff when her type is vH, vL, respectively.
The seller’s highest equilibrium payoff in G∞M(µ0) is of particular interest to us:
u∗S(µ0) = max{uS : (uS, uH , uL) ∈ E
∗
M(µ0)}. (1)
Theorem 1 characterizes u∗S(µ0) and an assessment that achieves it for all µ0 ∈
∆(V), which we denote by 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉.
2.1 Revelation Principle
There are at least two reasons that the game G∞M(µ0) is not a simple to analyze.
First, the seller’s action space is large and, a priori, it is not clear which mecha-
nisms could be ruled out from consideration. Second, fixed a seller’s strategy, and
hence a sequence of mechanisms faced by the buyer, we still need to understand
the buyer’s best response in the game induced by the sequence of mechanisms.
The main result of Doval and Skreta (2018) allows us to deal with these two com-
plications by (i) pinning down a well-defined set of mechanisms that we can re-
strict attention to, and (ii) pinning down the buyer’s behavior as a best response
to the sequence of mechanisms offered by the seller.
LetMC denote the set of all mechanisms where (M, S) = (V,∆(V)). Foreshad-
owing the result in Lemma 1, we label thesemechanisms canonical. LetG∞(µ0) de-
note the same game in the previous section, except that in each period the seller’s
action space isMC and let E
∗(µ0) denote the set of equilibrium payoffs of G
∞(µ0).
In Doval and Skreta (2018), we show that to characterize the set of equilibrium
payoffs of G∞M(µ0), it is enough to characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs of
G∞(µ0). Moreover, we also show that it is without loss of generality to focus on
a particular class of assessments to characterize all equilibrium payoffs in E∗(µ0).
Lemma 1 below summarizes these results for future reference:
following requirement. Let h and h′ be two consecutive information sets for the seller. The beliefs
at h′ are obtained via Bayes’ rule from the beliefs at h if one of the following holds: (i) conditional
on reaching h, h′ is reached with positive probability under the equilibrium strategy profile, or (ii)
conditional on reaching h, h′ is reached from h through a deviation by the seller and the buyer
playing the equilibrium strategy profile.
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Lemma 1 (Doval and Skreta (2018)). G∞M(µ0) and G
∞(µ0) have the same set of equi-
librium payoffs, i.e., E∗M(µ0) = E
∗(µ0).
Moreover, let (uS, uH, uL) ∈ E
∗(µ0). Then, there exists a PBE assessment 〈Γ, (πv, rv)v∈V , µ〉
of G∞(µ0) that achieves payoff (uS, uH, uL) and satisfies the following properties:
1. For all histories ht, the buyer participates in the mechanism offered by the seller at
that history and truthfully reports her type, with probability 1,
2. For all histories ht, if the mechanism offered by the seller at ht outputs posterior µ′,
the seller’s updated equilibrium beliefs about the buyer coincide with µ′,
3. The strategy of the buyer depends only on her private valuation and the public his-
tory.
Lemma 1 has two implications. First, it is without loss of generality to restrict
the seller to offering mechansims where the set of input messages are the set of
type reports and the set of output messages is the set of beliefs the seller has about
the buyer’s type. Second, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to
assessments that satisfy certain properties.
Part 1 of Lemma 1 implies the mechanisms chosen by the seller in equilibrium
must satisfy a participation constraint and an incentive compatibility constraint for
each buyer type and each public history. For completeness, these constraints
are stated in Section A.2; see Equation PCv,ht and Equation ICv,ht . As in the case
of commitment to long-term mechanisms, part 1 simplifies the analysis of the
buyer’s behavior, by reducing it to a series of constraints. Part 2 implies we can
interpret the seller’s choice of a communication device as a choice of a distribution
over posteriors that satisfies a Bayes’ plausibility constraint (see Equation BCµ(ht)
in Section A.2). As a consequence, our analysis involves aspects of information
design. Part 3 implies the set of PBE payoffs of G∞(µ0) coincides with the set of
Public PBE payoffs of G∞(µ0) (Athey and Bagwell (2008)), allowing us to invoke
self-generation techniques as in Abreu et al. (1990); Athey and Bagwell (2008) to
argue the assessment we construct in Section 3.3 is indeed a PBE assessment.
A corollary of Lemma 1 is that u∗S(µ0) is also the highest equilibrium payoff
the seller can obtain in G∞(µ0). The rest of the paper focuses on studying the
equilibrium payoffs of G∞(µ0) and when we refer to a PBE assessment, we mean
one that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1.
In what follows, we abuse notation in the following way. Because valuations
are binary, we can think of an element in ∆(V) (a distribution over vL and vH)
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as an element of the interval [0, 1] (the probability assigned to vH). We use the
latter formulation in what follows. That is, whereas the mechanism outputs a
distribution over vL and vH, we index this distribution by the probability of vH.
3 Main Result
Section 3 contains the main result of the paper: the optimal mechanism for a seller
of a durable good is a sequence of posted prices. To state the result, we proceed as
follows. First, we define what it means for the seller to attain a certain equilibrium
payoff via a sequence of posted prices, when the seller’s action space consists of
mechanisms (Definition 1). This is enough to informally state ourmain result. Sec-
ond, we describe a PBE assessment, 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉, that achieves u∗S(µ0) and
argue that, indeed, u∗S(µ0) can be implemented via a sequence of posted prices.
The rest of this section describes the main steps to prove 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉 in-
deed achieves u∗S(µ0).
Definition 1. Let uS denote a seller’s payoff in E
∗(µ0). The payoff uS can be im-
plemented via a sequence of posted prices if a PBE assessment 〈Γ, (πv, rv)v∈V , µ〉 exists
such that in each history ht, the seller’s mechanismM satisfies the following: there
exist µ′1 6= µ
′
2 and a price p(h
t) such that
1. βM(µ′1|vL) = β
M(µ′2|vH) = 1,
2. (qM(µ′1), x
M(µ′1)) = (0, 0) and (q
M(µ′2), x
M(µ′2)) = (1, p(h
t)).
Thus, a mechanism is a posted price whenever it can be implemented as if the
buyer could choose one of two options: either she buys the good at price p(ht), or
she does not buy the good, in which case she pays nothing. Note that when the
seller posts a price in each period, he does not use noisy communication devices:
by observing the posterior, the seller knows which report the buyer submitted into
the mechanism. However, the buyer’s report need not be truthful in this implemen-
tation.
Theorem 1. Let u∗S(µ0) denote the seller’s maximum revenue in a PBE. Then, u
∗
S(µ0)
can be implemented via a sequence of posted prices.
Theorem 1 shows that, amongst all trading protocols, posted prices are optimal.
This provides a microfoundation for the seller’s strategy space in the literature
that studies the sale of a durable good.
12
Theorem 1 echoes the result for the case in which the seller has commitment
and faces one buyer, where it is also well known that a posted price is optimal.
However, in the latter case, the seller would post the same price at all histories,
whichwould fail to be sequentially rational in G∞(µ0). Aswe show in the analysis
that follows, we find that the seller’s mechanism determines a price path that is
decreasing in the seller’s belief that the buyer’s valuation is vH , as in the literature
that analyzes the Coase conjecture.
PBE assessment that achieves u∗S(µ0): The proof of Theorem 1 singles out a par-
ticular PBE assessment, 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉, that achieves u∗S(µ0), which we now
define informally (the formal statement is in Section E.2). After defining it, we
use it to argue that u∗s (µ0) can be implemented via a sequence of posted prices.
In what follows, the ratio vL/vH is important and we denote it by µ1. To see why
µ1 is important, recall the following fact from second-degree price discrimination:
when the seller sells at a price of vL, he leaves rents, ∆v ≡ vH − vL, to vH , so that
when vH has probability µ, the seller’s revenue, vL, can be written as
vL = µ(vH − ∆v) + (1− µ)vL = µvH + (1− µ)(vL −
µ
1− µ
∆v) = µvH + (1− µ)vˆL(µ).
The first equality represents revenue as the surplus extracted from each type. The
second equality represents revenue as the virtual surplus, where the value of allo-
cating the good to vL is adjusted to capture the fact that when vL is served, so is
vH, which leaves rents to vH. µ1 is the belief at which vˆL(µ) = 0. At that belief,
the seller is indifferent between serving the buyer for both of her valuations and
excluding the low-valuation buyer.
We focus here and in the rest of this section on the case in which vL > 0; we
return to the (less interesting) case of vL = 0 at the end of this section. When
vL > 0, we show a sequence 0 = µ0 < µ1 = vL/vH < · · · < µn < . . . exists such
that the following holds:11
11Chapter 10 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) solves for the equilibrium of the price posting game
for the binary type case. Hart and Tirole (1988) compare price paths and the seller’s revenue across
different sale modes (sale vs. leasing) in a finite-horizon setting with limited commitment and
binary valuations. As in their model with sale, the optimal price path in our model is determined
by the beliefs at which the seller is indifferent between trading with the low-valuation buyer in
n versus n + 1 periods. However, because their model has a finite horizon and they define the
buyer’s value as a flow payoff from consuming the good, it is not immediate to compare the price
paths in both models.
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1. Along the equilibrium path:
(a) If at history ht, the seller’s beliefs, µ∗(ht), are in [µ0, µ1), he chooses a
mechanism such that (qM
∗
t (µ∗(ht)), xM
∗
t (µ∗(ht))) = (1, vL) and the com-
munication device satisfies that βM
∗
t (µ∗(ht)|v) = 1 for v ∈ {vL, vH}.
(b) If at history ht, the seller’s beliefs, µ∗(ht), are in [µn, µn+1) for n ≥ 1, the
seller’s mechanism satisfies the following. First, it induces two posteriors,
µn−1 and 1. Second, the allocation rule satisfies that (q
M∗t (1), xM
∗
t (1)) =
(1, vL+(1− δ
n)∆v), whereas (qM
∗
t (µn−1), x
M∗t (µn−1)) = (0, 0). Finally, the
communication device maps vL to µn−1, whereas it maps vH to both µn−1
and 1with positive probability. The probabilities βM
∗
t (µn−1|vH), β
M∗t (1|vH)
are chosen so that when the seller observes µn−1, his updated belief coin-
cides with µn−1.
2. Off the equilibrium path, the seller’s strategy coincides with the above, except
that when µ∗(ht) = µn for some n ≥ 1, the seller may randomize between the
mechanism he offers on the path of play when his belief is µn and the one he
offers on the path of play when his belief is µn−1.
12
3. At each history ht, the buyer’s best response to the seller’s equilibrium offer at
ht is to participate in the mechanism and truthfully report her valuation.
Implementation via posted prices: We now argue that if the assessment de-
scribed above achieves u∗S(µ0), then u
∗
S(µ0) can be achieved via a sequence of
posted prices. Clearly, when the seller’s beliefs are below µ1, the seller’s mecha-
nism corresponds to selling the good at a price of vL. Consider then the case in
which the seller’s beliefs are in [µ1, µ2). Note that when the buyer’s valuation is vH
and the realized allocation is trade, then her payoff is vH − vL − (1− δ)∆v = δ∆v.
On the other hand, when the buyer’s valuation is vH and the realized allocation
is no trade, then the seller’s beliefs next period are µ0 = 0, so that the buyer’s
continuation payoff is δ∆v. That is, the buyer with valuation vH is indifferent
between obtaining the good at price vL + (1− δ)∆v and not obtaining the good,
and paying a price of vL in the next period. Since the buyer with valuation is vH
12The need for mixing arises for technical reasons: it ensures that the buyer’s continuation
payoffs when her valuation is vH are upper-semicontinuous and, thus, guarantees that a best re-
sponse exists after any deviation by the seller (see Section E.1). Indeed, we appeal to the results
in Simon and Zame (1990) to simultaneously determine the buyer’s best response and the seller’s
mixing.
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is indifferent between these two options, she is willing to mix between buying
at price vL + (1− δ)∆v and not obtaining the good. She does so in a way that
the seller’s belief is µ0 when the allocation is (0, 0). Since µ0 = 0, it implies that
when the seller’s belief is in [µ1, µ2), the buyer buys with probability 1 at a price
of vL + (1− δ)∆v. Working recursively through the equations, one can show that
when the seller’s prior is in [µn, µn+1), the mechanism is equivalent to posting a
price of vL + (1− δ
n)∆v. In this case, the low-valuation buyer chooses the (0, 0)
allocation, whereas the high-valuation buyer mixes so that the seller’s belief is
µn−1 when the allocation is (0, 0).
It is interesting to contrast the implementation under the PBE assessment
〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉 described above with the implementation via posted prices.
In the former, the buyer is truthful and the seller rations the high valuation buyer
as in Denicolo and Garella (1999), which slows down the rate at which the seller’s
beliefs fall conditional on the good not being sold. Instead, in the implementa-
tion via posted prices, the high valuation buyer misreports her type with positive
probability, which, like rationing, prevents the seller from becoming pessimistic
too quickly about the buyer’s valuation. Since both implementations are payoff
equivalent, the seller cannot do better with rationing than with posted prices.
The rest of this section describes the steps to show the assessment, 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉,
achieves u∗S(µ0). Section 3.1 derives necessary conditions that the PBE assessment,
〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉, must satisfy. They are the basis for the formulation of a re-
cursive problem, the intrapersonal game, studied in Section 3.2. The main output
of Section 3.2 is a mapping γ∗ : ∆(V) 7→ MC, which describes for each prior µ
′
0
the seller may have about the buyer, his optimal choice of mechanism. Section
3.3 discusses then how we use γ∗ to construct 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉. Finally, we
appeal to self-generation techniques to show 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉 is indeed a PBE
assessment.
3.1 Binding constraints and virtual surplus
The main output of Section 3.1 is Problem 1 at the end of this section, which relies
on Proposition 1 below. To introduce Proposition 1, we introduce the definition of
incentive efficiency (see Bester and Strausz (2001)):13
13Incentive efficiency as defined in Bester and Strausz (2001) is related, but different from,
incentive efficiency as defined in Holmstro¨m and Myerson (1983). While the definition in
Holmstro¨m and Myerson (1983) would allow for Pareto improvements for both the buyer and
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Definition 2 (Incentive efficiency). Let 〈Γ, (πv , rv)v∈V , µ〉 be a PBE assessment and
(uS, uH , uL) its associated payoff. 〈Γ, (πv, rv)v∈V , µ〉 is incentive efficient if no u
′
S >
uS exists such that (u
′
S, uH, uL) ∈ E
∗(µ0).
In an incentive efficient PBE, the seller at the beginning of the game is earning
his best payoff consistent with the buyer’s equilibrium payoff.
Proposition 1. If 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉 is the PBE assessment that delivers the seller’s
best payoff in E∗(µ0), u
∗
S(µ0), the following hold:
1. Without loss of generality, if the buyer rejects the seller’s equilibrium choice of mech-
anism at history ht, the seller assigns probability 1 to the buyer’s valuation being
vH.
2. For every history on the path of play, ht, 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉|ht is incentive effi-
cient.
3. For all histories on the path of (Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V), the buyer is indifferent between
participating in the mechanism and not when her valuation is vL.
4. For all histories on the path of (Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V), the buyer is indifferent between
reporting vH and vL when her valuation is vH.
Part 1 implies that it is without loss of generality to assume that the buyer’s
value of rejecting the seller’s equilibrium choice of mechanism is 0: when the
seller assigns probability 1 to vH, the seller asks for a payment of vH. Part 1 fol-
lows from two observations: (i) By Lemma 1, the buyer’s rejection of the seller’s
equilibrium offer is an off the path event, so that the seller’s beliefs are not pinned
down by Bayes’ rule, and (ii) by setting the beliefs of the seller to 1 on that event,
we only relax the buyer’s participation constraint without affecting the seller’s
incentives.14
Part 2 is a consequence of the result that it is without loss of generality to focus
on Public PBE. While in general it is not true that 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉|ht is a PBE
assessment of G∞(µ∗(ht)), this is indeed the case when 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉 is a
Public PBE assessment (see Proposition I.1 in Doval and Skreta (2019)). Part 2
then says that along the equilibrium path the seller’s continuation payoff is the
the seller, the definition in Bester and Strausz (2001) only considers Pareto improvements for the
seller.
14Part 1 of Proposition 1 is not a consequence of using PBE as opposed to sequential equilibrium,
since the buyer could always tremble and reject the mechanism with a higher probability when
her valuation is vH.
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highest equilibrium payoff consistent with the buyer’s equilibrium payoff. Thus,
while the seller may not be earning u∗S(µ
∗(ht)) for a history ht on the equilibrium
path, the payoffs starting from ht are the highest equilibrium payoffs consistent
with the buyer’s payoff at ht.
Parts 3 and 4 imply that the standard observations from second-degree price
discrimination hold along the path of play of 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉, namely, that
all surplus is extracted from the buyer when her valuation is vL and the buyer’s
payoff coincides with her information rents when her valuation is vH . Clearly,
they must hold at the initial history, because either of them failing implies the
seller is “leaving money on the table.” That they hold after every history on the
path of play is a result of discounting and the linearity of payoffs in transfers,
which allows us to distribute the players’ payoffs across time without affecting
(and sometimes even increasing) payoffs at some history.15
It follows from parts 3 and 4 that the participation constraint for vL and the
incentive compatibility constraint for vH bind along the equilibrium path.
16 Recall
that when the seller has commitment to long-term mechanisms, these constraints
are the ones that we use to replace the transfers out of the seller’s payoffs, so that
they are expressed solely in terms of the allocation. In what follows, we show
that the same can be done when analyzing the revenue-maximizing PBE when
the seller can only commit to short-term mechanisms.
Let u∗S(µ0) denote the seller’s highest equilibrium payoff in G
∞(µ0) and let
〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉 denote the PBE assessment that achieves it. Lemma 1 implies
that we can write u∗S(µ0) as follows:
u∗S(µ0) = ∑
v∈V
µ0(v) ∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM
∗
0 (µ′|v)[xM
∗
0 (µ′) + δ(1− qM
∗
0 (µ′))U∗S(M
∗
0, 1, µ
′, 0, xM
∗
0 )], (2)
15Parts 2-4 may sound counterintuitive from a dynamic game perspective: there are games
where, to sustain high payoffs today, low continuation payoffs are needed, even on the equilib-
rium path. Importantly, when we prove Proposition 1, we show that when we modify the strategy
profile from history ht onwards, we do not upset the equilibrium constraints at the histories that
precede ht, thereby showing that the new assessment is also a PBE assessment.
16Although with binary types, the incentive constraint for vH binds as a result of revenue max-
imization, with a continuum of types the adjacent downward-looking incentive constraints obtain
because incentive compatibility implies the envelope representation of payoffs. In the online ap-
pendix to Doval and Skreta (2018), we show how to obtain the envelope representation of payoffs
in the abstract mechanism selection game we study there; it is immediate to show that it holds
in this game as well. Thus, with a continuum of types, we obtain a representation of the seller’s
payoff similar to the one in this section.
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where U∗S(h
1) denotes the seller’s payoffs under (Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V) from t = 1 on-
wards. ( Note that U∗S(h
1) is not necessarily u∗S(µ
∗(h1)) and hence the difference
in notation.) By definition, u∗S(µ0) is the highest payoff the seller can achieve,
given the continuation strategy, from among all mechanisms M ∈ MC that sat-
isfy the participation and incentive compatibility constraints at the initial history.
Proposition 1 impliesM∗0 satisfies the following three properties. First, the buyer’s
payoff is 0 when her valuation is vL, so that the following holds:
∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM
∗
0 (µ′|vL)vLq
M∗0(µ′) = ∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM
∗
0(µ′|vL)x
M∗0 (µ′), (3)
where we have already replaced the buyer’s continuation value with 0. Second,
when the buyer’s valuation is vH, she is indifferent between reporting vH and vL,
so that the following equality holds:
∑
µ′∈∆(V)
(βM
∗
0 (µ′|vH)− β
M∗0 (µ′|vL))(vHq
M∗0(µ′) + (1− qM
∗
0(µ′))U∗H|L(h
1))
= ∑
µ′∈∆(V)
(βM
∗
0 (µ′|vH)− β
M∗0 (µ′|vL))x
M∗0 (µ′), (4)
where the notationU∗
H|L(h
1) signifies that the continuation value of a buyer of val-
uation vH is the utility that she would obtain from the allocation that corresponds
to vL – these are her information rents. Finally, the induced distribution over
posteriors averages out to µ0. That is, letting τ
M∗0(µ0, µ
′) = ∑v∈V µ0(v)β
M∗0 (µ′|v)
denote the probability that posterior µ′ is induced, we have
∑
µ′∈∆(V)
τM
∗
0(µ0, µ
′)µ′ = µ0. (5)
Replacing transfers out of seller’s payoff: We can replace equations 3-5 in Equation 2
to obtain
u∗S(µ0) =
∑µ′∈∆(V) τ
M∗0 (µ0, µ′)
[
qM
∗
0 (µ′)(µ′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ0)) + (1− q
M∗0 (µ′))×
δ
(
U∗S(h
1) + ( µ
′
1−µ′ −
µ0
1−µ0
)(1− µ′)U∗
H|L(h
1)
)] , (6)
where
vˆL(µ0) = vL −
µ0
1− µ0
∆v,
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is the buyer’s virtual value when her valuation is vL and the seller assigns proba-
bility µ0 to the buyer’s valuation being vH .
Equation 6 says that we can think of the seller’s optimal mechanism at t = 0
as choosing a distribution over posteriors, τM
∗
0 , and, for each posterior he in-
duces, a probability of trade, qM
∗
0 . If at a given posterior, µ′, he sells the good
(i.e., qM
∗
0 (µ′) = 1), he obtains the expected virtual surplus, where the expectation is
taken with respect to µ′, but the low-valuation buyer’s virtual value is evaluated
at µ0. That the low-valuation buyer’s virtual value is evaluated at µ0 instead of at
µ′ is intuititive. After all, the seller assigns probability µ0 to the buyer’s valuation
being vH so that, whenever he sells to both buyer types (i.e., µ
′
> 0), he leaves
rents to vH with probability µ0. If at a given posterior, µ
′, he delays trade (i.e.,
qM
∗
0(µ′) = 0), then he receives his continuation payoff. However, it is modified
by the buyer’s continuation rents: the seller internalizes that, whenever trade is
delayed, the buyer receives continuation rents when her valuation is vH. Note the
continuation rents enter with a term that depends on µ0: the seller assigns proba-
bility µ0 to vH, and hence that is the rate at which he pays rents (this time in terms
of continuation values) to the buyer.
It follows from Proposition 1 that an expression similar to that of Equation 6
holds for any history ht on the path of (Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V). That is,
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U∗S(h
t) =
∑µ′∈∆(V) τ
M∗t (µ∗(ht), µ′)
[
qM
∗
t (µ′)(µ′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ
∗(ht))) + (1− qM
∗
t (µ′))×
δ
(
U∗S(h
t+1) + ( µ
′
1−µ′ −
µ∗(ht)
1−µ∗(ht)
)(1− µ′)U∗
H|L(h
t+1)
)] ,
(7)
where ∑µ′∈∆(V) τ
M∗t (µ∗(ht), µ′)µ′ = µ∗(ht).
Part 2 implies that this payoff is the best one the seller can achieve in E∗(µ∗(ht)),
consistent with the buyer’s payoff from ht onwards. That is, from amongst all the
mechanisms that satisfy the participation and incentive compatibility constraints
given the buyer’s equilibrium payoffs,M∗t delivers the seller the highest payoff at
ht.
As in Equation 6, Equation 7 shows that the seller’s mechanism at ht can be
thought of as a distribution over posteriors, τM
∗
t , and a probability of trade, qM
∗
t .
(τM
∗
t , qM
∗
t ) are chosen so as to maximize a version of the virtual surplus, evaluated
at the seller’s prior belief at ht, µ∗(ht). As in the discussion of Equation 6, the
17Equation 7 is obtained by replacing the corresponding versions of equations 3-5 at history ht.
19
virtual value vˆL is evaluated at µ
∗(ht) because µ∗(ht) is the probability the seller
assigns to the buyer’s valuation being vH at h
t.
Moreover, by expanding the above expressions and using the Bayes’ consistency
conditions, we can show that if ht+1 = (ht,M∗t , 1, µ
′, (0, xM
∗
t (µ′))) is a history on
the path of (Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V), then:
U∗S(h
t+1) +
(
µ′
1− µ′
−
µ∗(ht)
1− µ∗(ht)
)
(1− µ′)U∗H|L(h
t+1) =
∑µ˜∈∆(V) τ
M∗t+1(µ′, µ˜)
[
qM
∗
t+1(µ˜)(µ˜vH + (1− µ˜)vˆL(µ
∗(ht))) + (1− qM
∗
t+1(µ˜))×
δ
(
U∗S(h
t+2) + ( µ˜1−µ˜ −
µ∗(ht)
1−µ∗(ht) )(1− µ˜)U
∗
H|L(h
t+2)
)] , (8)
where we use that in history ht+1 the seller assigns probability µ′ to the buyer’s
valuation being vH.
The above expression shows how the term
(
µ′
1−µ′ −
µ∗(ht)
1−µ∗(ht)
)
(1− µ′)U∗
H|L(h
t+1)
adjusts the seller’s continuation values. If at history ht, the seller’s mechanism
does not sell the good to the buyer with some probability, he understands that
the buyer receives continuation rents U∗
H|L(h
t+1), which have to be reflected in
the payments of M∗t . Because the seller assigns probability µ
∗(ht) to the buyer’s
valuation being vH, he pays those rents with probability µ
∗(ht). Hence, he adjusts
the continuation values to reflect his perceived probability of paying these future
rents, so that from his perspective, the virtual value vˆL(·) is computed at µ
∗(ht) at
all periods after t.
By contrast, Equation 7 evaluated at period t + 1 shows that when the seller’s
prior is µ′, he chooses his mechanism taking into account that he leaves rents with
probability µ′ to the buyer. Whenever µ′ 6= µ∗(ht), the seller in period t+ 1 does
not internalize the cost he may impose on his “predecessor” because he evaluates
leaving rents to the high-valuation buyer differently than how the seller in period
t does.
One last implication of incentive efficiency is that, along the equilibrium path,
the seller’s beliefs together with the buyer’s rents pin down the strategy profile:
Corollary 1. Let 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉 be the PBE assessment that delivers payoff
u∗S(µ0). If there are two histories, h
τ , ht, on the path of play such that µ∗(ht) =
µ∗(hτ) andU∗
H|L
(ht) = U∗
H|L
(hτ), then Γ∗(hτ) and Γ∗(ht) are payoff equivalent for
the seller.
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Corollary 1 implies that along the equilibrium path, we can think of U∗S(h
t) and
U∗
H|L(h
t) as functions of the seller’s belief µ∗(ht). In a slight abuse of notation, we
denote them by U∗S(µ
∗(ht)) and U∗
H|L(µ
∗(ht)).
Corollary 1, Equation 7, and Equation 8 are the basis for the recursive formula-
tion we use to characterize the seller’s highest equilibrium payoff, u∗S(µ0). Indeed,
let ht be a history such that the seller assigns probability µ∗ to vH. Define
R∗(µ′, µ∗) = U∗S(µ
′) + (
µ′
1− µ′
−
µ∗
1− µ∗
)(1− µ′)U∗H|L(µ
′),
and let
R∗(µ∗, µ∗) = (9)
∑
µ′∈∆(V)
τM
∗
t (µ∗, µ′)(qM
∗
t (µ′)(µ′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ
∗)) + (1− qM
∗
t (µ′))δR∗(µ′, µ∗)).
Consider now the following problem:
Problem 1. Find a policy (τ, q) : ∆(V) 7→ ∆(∆(V)) × [0, 1]∆(V) and a value func-
tion R(τ,q) such that18
1. For all µ0 ∈ ∆(V),
∫
µ′τ(µ0, dµ
′) = µ0,
2. For all µ0, µ
′ ∈ ∆(V) such that µ0 < 1,
R(τ,q)(µ′, µ0) =
∫ [
q(µ′, µ˜)(µ˜vH + (1− µ˜)vˆL(µ0)) + δ(1− q(µ
′, µ˜))R(τ,q)(µ˜, µ0)
]
τ(µ′, dµ˜),
3. For all 0 ≤ µ0 < 1,
R(τ,q)(µ0, µ0) ≥
∫ [
q′(µ0, µ
′)(µ′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ0)) + δ(1− q
′(µ0, µ
′))R(τ,q)(µ′, µ0)
]
τ′(µ0, dµ
′)
for all τ′(µ0, ·) ∈ ∆∆(V) such that
∫
µ′τ′(µ0, dµ
′) = µ0 and all q
′(µ0, ·) :
∆(V) 7→ [0, 1]. For µ0 = 1, q(1, 1) = 1.
A solution to Problem 1 specifies (i) for each prior, µ0, a Bayes’ plausible distri-
bution over posteriors (part 1) and a probability of trade for each induced poste-
rior, and (ii) continuation values that are consistent with the policy (part 2). More-
over, 〈(τ, q), R(τ,q)〉 is a solution if for each prior belief the seller may hold, he
18In what follows, we abuse notation and denote q(µ0)(µ
′) ∈ [0, 1] by q(µ0, µ
′).
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does not have a one-shot deviation from the policy, (τ, q), given the continuation
values (part 3).
Standard dynamic programming arguments imply that if we find a solution,
〈(τ∗, q∗), R(τ
∗ ,q∗)〉, to Problem 1, we will have found a solution to the system de-
fined by Equation 7 for every ht on the path of play. Because this system of equa-
tions satisfies the necessary conditions in Proposition 1, R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µ0, µ0) is an upper
bound on u∗S(µ0). If we then show that there is a PBE that attains R
(τ∗ ,q∗)(µ0, µ0),
we have characterized the seller’s best PBE payoff using the solution to the recur-
sive program.
3.2 Intrapersonal game
Problem 1 is not a decision problem, but a game.19 The players in this game repre-
sent the seller holding different beliefs about the buyer’s valuation being vH . Each
player chooses a distribution over posteriors that averages out to his prior and, for
each posterior that is induced, a probability of trade. In this way, Problem 1 is a
formal representation of an idea already present in the literature on the sale of a
durable good: when the seller cannot commit not to lower the prices in the future,
the seller today competes against his future selves.20
19While at first glance Problem 1 looks like a dynamic programming formulation of the seller’s
problem in Equation 6, it is not. After all we cannot apply Bellman’s principle of optimality
since the strategy that is optimal for the seller at t = 0 is not necessarily the one that contin-
ues to be optimal as time goes by and the seller accumulates information about the buyer’s type.
Instead Problem 1 takes the perspective that the seller in each period is a distinct player who
chooses his action so as to maximize his payoff, based on the anticipation of what others will do.
Problem 1 corresponds then to a sequential game with infinitely many players (one for each be-
lief the seller may have), who each act only once. This approach is common in the literature on
time inconsistency that followed the seminal work of Strotz (1955); see Vieille and Weibull (2009)
and Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2014) for excellent discussions of the differences with (time-consistent)
dynamic programming.
20McAfee and Wiseman (2008) put forward this intuition in the introduction to their paper. In a
sense, it already appears in Coase (1972) where Coase points out
[. . . ] In these circumstances, why should the landowner continue to hold MQ off
the market? The original landowner could obviously improve his position by selling
more land since he could by these means acquire more money. It is true that this
would reduce the value of the land OM owned by those who had previously bought
land from him loss would fall on them, not on him.
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Contrast the analysis so far with the solution if we did not require that the
seller’s strategy be sequentially rational. An analogue of parts 3 and 4 of Proposition 1
would also hold in that case. Moreover, we would use them to replace the trans-
fers out of the seller’s problem to obtain a program in which the seller maximizes
the virtual surplus. However, under commitment, the maximization of the virtual
surplus is now a decision problem: in the event that he does not sell the good, the
seller does not need to consider that his mechanism may not be optimal given the
information he has now learned.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned difference, Problem 1 shares a useful sim-
ilarity with the usual approach when the designer has commitment: in both cases,
the buyer’s behavior has been reduced to a system of equations and is no longer a
player.21 Moreover, under the assumption of transferable utility, these equations
allow us to express the seller’s problem only in terms of choosing the allocation
and the communication device. This result is a consequence of the application
of the revelation principle in Doval and Skreta (2018), and thus, we expect that a
similar simplification is feasible in settings other than the one we study here.
Problems like Problem 1 have a long tradition in economics. Indeed, it is an ex-
ample of an intrapersonal equilibrium (see Pollak (1968); Peleg and Yaari (1973);
Harris and Laibson (2001); Bernheim et al. (2015)).22 For future reference, we record
this observation in Definition 3 below.
Definition 3. A policy (τ, q) : ∆(V) 7→ ∆(∆(V)) × [0, 1]∆(V) and a value function
R(τ,q) constitute an intrapersonal equilibrium if they solve Problem 1.
The main result of this section shows that an intrapersonal equilibrium exists
in the game that we study. This is stated formally in Theorem 2 below (note the
sequence in the statement is the one described after the statement of Theorem 1).
Theorem 2. There exists a unique intrapersonal equilibrium, 〈(τ∗, q∗), R(τ
∗ ,q∗)〉. Indeed,
there exists a sequence 0 = µ0 < µ1 = vL/vH < · · · < µn < . . . such that if
µ0 ∈ [µi, µi+1),
21Contrast this to the approach in Freixas et al. (1985); Laffont and Tirole (1987, 1988);
Bester and Strausz (2001); Gerardi and Maestri (2018) among others, where the designer can offer
menus of contracts and observes the agent’s choice out of the menu. In these papers, the offered
menu together with the agent’s choice out of the menu determine the designer’s beliefs about the
agent’s type. This makes it difficult to separate the design of the allocation from the “design” of
the information that is revealed by the choice out of the menu.
22Indeed, the system defined by Equation 7 and Equation 8 has analogues in the work of
Harris and Laibson (2001) and Bernheim et al. (2015) on hyperbolic discounting.
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1. and i = 0, then τ∗(µ0, µ0) = 1, q
∗(µ0, µ0) = 1, while
2. if i ≥ 1, then τ∗(µ0, 1) = 1 − τ
∗(µ0, µi−1) = (µ0 − µi−1)/(1 − µi−1) and
q∗(µ0, 1) = 1 = 1− q
∗(µ0, µi−1).
Theorem 2 says that when the seller’s prior is low (i.e., µ0 < µ1), he sells with
probability 1 and transmits no information, whereaswhen the seller’s prior is high
(i.e., µ1 ≤ µ0), he induces two posteriors: one in which trade happens (µ
′ = 1) and
one in which trade is delayed (µ′ = µi−1).
Theorem 2 is the basis for the equilibrium constructed in Theorem 1. Indeed, the
communication device and the probability of trade used by the seller to achieve
hismaximumPBE payoff are those from the intrapersonal equilibrium.23 Theorem 2,
however, says nothing about the transfers or the buyer’s behavior in the PBE as-
sessment. After all, in the intrapersonal game, the seller is the only player.
The proof of Theorem 2 is constructive. The rest of this section sketches out the
main steps and provides intuition for Theorem 2. The reader interested in under-
standing how we move from the intrapersonal equilibrium to a PBE assessment
that delivers payoff u∗S(µ0) may skip straight to Section 3.3, where we tackle the
last step of our construction.
Necessary conditions: To show that an intrapersonal equilibrium exists and
is unique, we proceed as follows. Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 below de-
scribe necessary conditions that an intrapersonal equilibriummust satisfy. We use
these properties to build a candidate policy, (τ∗, q∗), and its continuation values,
R(τ
∗ ,q∗), and show they constitute an equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Let 〈(τ∗, q∗), R(τ
∗ ,q∗)〉 denote an intrapersonal equilibrium. Then, the
following hold:
1. If µ0 < µ1, then q
∗(µ0, µ
′) = 1 for all µ′ ∈ ∆(V),
2. If µ0 > µ1, then the seller places positive probability on two beliefs, {µD(µ0), 1},
and sets q∗(µ0, µD(µ0)) = 0 and q
∗(µ0, 1) = 1.
An incomplete intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. To understand part 1,
recall that the solution when the seller has commitment and his prior is below µ1
is to sell to both types of the buyer with probability 1. This is still a solution under
23More precisely, the communication device used by the seller is derived from the distribution
over posteriors in the intrapersonal equilibrium.
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limited commitment and is clearly the best that the seller can do. To understand
part 2, note that in the intrapersonal equilibrium, the seller’s problem is as follows:
R(τ
∗,q∗)(µ0, µ0) = max
τ,q
∫ 1
0
(
q(µ′)(µ′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ0)) + (1− q(µ
′))δR(τ
∗,q∗)(µ′, µ0)
)
τ(dµ′)
= max
τ
∫ 1
0
max{µ′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ0), δR
(τ∗,q∗)(µ′, µ0)}τ(dµ
′). (10)
Indeed, given the continuation values, the seller can obtain whatever is best be-
tween selling today (with value µ′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ0)) and delaying trade (with
value δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µ′, µ0)), by choosing q(·) appropriately.
Equation 10 shows the seller’s problem is like an information design problem.24
Starting from an equilibrium 〈(τ∗, q∗), R(τ
∗ ,q∗)〉, it follows that the seller always
has a best response in which he uses at most two posteriors. Conditional on in-
ducing two posteriors, it follows that the seller sets q = 0 for one and q = 1 for
the other (Proposition C.1 in Section C.1). That the seller induces a posterior of 1
when he sets q = 1 is intuitive: the largest payoff he can get when he sells is vH.
By setting q = 0 for at most one posterior, the seller maximizes the probability
with which he induces a posterior of 1.25
The reason this intuition is incomplete is that we have only argued that there
is a best response in which the seller uses at most two posteriors, not that every
best response involves two posteriors. While the seller with belief µ0 is indiffer-
ent between all his best responses, this does not mean that a seller with belief
µ′0 is indifferent between all the solutions to Equation 10. Thus, starting from
an intrapersonal equilibrium 〈(τ∗, q∗), R(τ
∗ ,q∗)〉, we cannot just replace the policy
(τ∗(µ0, ·), q
∗(µ0, ·)) for the one that solves the maximization in Equation 10 and
that induces at most two posteriors. This may affect the best response condition
of a seller with belief µ′0 6= µ0 that either (i) assigns positive probability to µ0 in
the candidate equilibrium and sees his payoff changed as a result of the change
in the policy for µ0, or (ii) does not assign positive probability to µ0, but may now
prefer to do so.
Key to our result is then to show that the seller uses at most two posteriors
for any prior µ0 in any solution to Problem 1 (Proposition III.2 in Appendix III
24However, we cannot just invoke concavification-style arguments because the continuation val-
ues, R(τ
∗,q∗), may fail to be upper semi-continuous (see the discussion at the end of this section).
25The linearity of the seller’s payoff in the allocation and in the posterior beliefs in the event
of trade matters for this argument. The same linearity obtains when the buyer’s valuations are
drawn from a continuum.
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in Doval and Skreta (2019)). Proposition C.1 implies that whenever the seller in-
duces a posterior at which the allocation is q = 0, his beliefs drop, i.e., the induced
posterior is below the prior. That is, whenever the seller does not trade, he be-
comes more pessimistic about the buyer’s valuation being high, which increases
his temptation to lower the price to vL.
Policies (τ, q) where the seller uses more than two posteriors could help the
seller slow down the rate at which his beliefs drop. Consider, for instance, a
seller with belief µ0 who induces three posteriors µ
′
1 < µ
′
2 < µ0 < 1. Any seller
with prior µ′0 > µ0 who induces a posterior equal to µ0 prefers the ”three-way”
split over the policy in which the seller with belief µ0 just induces posteriors µ
′
1
and 1, since the three-way split implies a slower decay in beliefs. This kind of
slow and probabilistic rationing exploits analogous forces as those in the construc-
tion in Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) and is behind the optimality of rationing in
Denicolo and Garella (1999). Ruling out that these more complex policies can be
part of an intrapersonal equilibrium is probably where the assumption of binary
valuations matters the most. The proof of Proposition III.2 exploits the properties
of intrapersonal equilibria where for each prior, µ0, the seller induces at most two
posteriors listed in Proposition 3 below, to which we turn next.
The result in Proposition 2 implies we can reduce the construction of the intrap-
ersonal equilibrium to the construction of the belief µD(µ0) at which the seller
sets q = 0 when µ0 > µ1. Suppose 〈µD∗ , R
µD∗ 〉 is an intrapersonal equilib-
rium, where RµD∗ are the continuation values implied by the policy that sets
q∗(µ0, µD∗(µ0)) = 0. The martingale property of beliefs implies
τ∗(µ0, µD∗(µ0)) =
1− µ0
1− µD∗(µ0)
,
so that part 2 of Problem 1 implies
RµD∗ (µ0, µ0) =
µ0 − µD∗(µ0)
1− µD∗(µ0)
vH +
1− µ0
1− µD∗(µ0)
RµD∗ (µD∗(µ0), µ0). (11)
Proposition 3 characterizes the properties of µD∗ , under the assumption that such
an equilibrium exists:
Proposition 3. Suppose 〈µD∗ , R
µD∗ 〉 is an intrapersonal equilibrium. Then, the follow-
ing hold:
1. If µ1 < µ0 is such that µD∗(µ0) < µ1, then µD∗(µ0) = 0.
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2. If µ1 < µ0, then there exists Nµ0 < ∞ such that the seller’s belief drops below µ1
after Nµ0 periods, i.e., µ
(Nµ0 )
D∗ (µ0) ≤ µ1.
3. If µ0 < µ
′
0, then µD∗(µ0) ≤ µD∗(µ
′
0).
4. If Nµ0 = Nµ′0 , then µD
∗(µ0) = µD∗(µ
′
0).
The proof is in Appendix C. In what follows, we provide intuition for the re-
sult, which in turn also provides intuition for the structure of the intrapersonal
equilibrium in Theorem 2.
Part 1 is immediate. Recall from Proposition 2 that a seller with prior µ′0 < µ1
trades immediately. Thus, if a seller with prior µ1 < µ0 sets µD∗(µ0) = µ˜ ∈ (0, µ1),
he knows that he trades with vL in the next period. That is, R
µD∗ (µ˜, µ0) = µ˜vH +
(1 − µ˜)vˆL(µ0). By setting µD∗(µ0) = 0, the seller with prior µ0 maximizes the
probability of trading with the high-valuation buyer today.
Part 2 says that tradewith the buyer when her valuation is vH happens in finitely
many periods. It does not say, however, that the same is true when the buyer’s
valuation is vL, unless 0 < µ1. We now explain why the seller taking infinitely
many periods for his belief to update below µ1, conditional on the event of not
allocating the good, cannot be part of an intrapersonal equilibrium. Starting from
any prior, µ1 < µ0, the repeated application of the function µD∗ induces a decreas-
ing sequence of beliefs, µm = µ
(m)
D∗ (µ0), all of them above µ1. But if µm remains
above µ1 for every finite m, the probability τ
∗(µm, 1) becomes small. Furthermore,
a seller with a prior µm always has the possibility of placing weight µm on 1 and
the remaining weight on 0. We show that for m large enough, this deviation is
profitable. Thus, whereas the seller with prior belief, µ0, would benefit from his
successors never splitting their beliefs below µ1, taking infinitely many periods to
update below µ1 cannot be part of an intrapersonal equilibrium.
Part 2 echoes the results in Fudenberg et al. (1985), Gul et al. (1986), andAusubel and Deneckere
(1989) that in the “gap” case, trade happenswith both types of the buyer in finitely
many periods.26 We do not phrase it in these terms because when vL = 0, which
corresponds to the no-gap case in our model, part 2 holds; however, in the unique
intrapersonal equilibrium, the seller with prior µ0 = 0 does not allocate the good
to the buyer whose valuation is vL. Because once we reach a posterior of 0 beliefs
do not change, trade never happens with the low-valuation buyer.
26The formal arguments are reminiscent to those in De Fraja and Muthoo (2000) and
Condorelli et al. (2016).
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Parts 3-4 say the policy is monotone in that if µ0 < µ
′
0, the seller with belief
µ′0 chooses a higher posterior at which to delay trade than the seller with belief
µ0. This is intuitive. When 0 < µ1, the rents for the high-valuation buyer are
determined by how long it takes to trade with vL: the longer it takes, the lower
the rents. The seller’s prior is also the probability with which he pays rents to the
buyer. Thus, the higher the prior, the higher the incentive for the seller to delay
trade with vL so as to make the rents for vH smaller.
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Part 4 is important in the construction of the intrapersonal equilibrium when
0 < µ1. We can classify the priors, µ0, according to how many periods it takes for
µ0 to drop below µ1. That is, define
Dn = {µ0 ∈ ∆(V) : µ
(n)
D∗ (µ0) = 0}, (12)
where we appeal to Proposition 3 to say that the “final” belief at which the seller
updates is 0 and we define D0 = {0}. Part 4 says that if µ0, µ
′
0 ∈ Dn, they delay
trade at the same posterior. Otherwise, by setting µD∗(·) to bemin{µD∗(µ0), µD∗(µ
′
0)},
the seller (weakly) increases the probability of immediately trading with vH with-
out affecting how long it takes to trade with vL (both µD∗(µ0), µD∗(µ
′
0) correspond
to beliefs for which the seller trades in n− 1 periods with vL.)
Part 4 suggests the “smallest” element of Dn
28 is of relevance: this prior, denoted
by µn in what follows, is the “largest” prior in Dn−1 and the “smallest” in Dn.
The equilibrium policy, (τ∗, q∗), in Theorem 2 selects the policy of µn so that it is
an element of Dn. We break the indifference between n and n − 1 periods until
updating to 0 in favor of n.
The sequence {µn}n≥0: We now construct the cutoffs µn. We set µ0 = 0 and
recall that µ1 denotes the ratio vL/vH . Note that it satisfies that
µ1vH + (1− µ1)vˆL(µ1) = µ1vH + (1− µ1)δ vˆL(µ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
RµD∗ (0,µ1)
, (13)
because vˆL(µ1) = 0. Equation 13 shows that, when his prior is µ1, the seller is
indifferent between trading today with both types of the buyer, or trading today
27Note that when µ1 = 0, the seller sets µD(µ0) = 0 for all 0 < µ0: in this case, the seller never
pays rents to the buyer, so that for each prior, the seller sells to the high-valuation buyer with the
maximum possible probability, µ0.
28Technically, at this point, an infimum rather than a minimum.
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with the buyer whose type is vH and waiting until tomorrow to trade with the
buyer whose type is vL. Set µD∗(µ1) = 0 = µ0 and τ(µ1, 0) = 1− µ1. That is,
we break the indifference of the seller with belief µ1 between trading immediately
with vL and delaying trade with vL for one period in favor of delaying trade.
For n ≥ 1, define inductively µn+1 to be the prior of the seller such that
µn+1− µn
1− µn
vH +
1− µn+1
1− µn
δRµD∗ (µn, µn+1) =
µn+1− µn−1
1− µn−1
vH +
1− µn+1
1− µn−1
δRµD∗ (µn−1, µn+1).
(14)
That is, when the seller’s prior is µn+1, he is indifferent between taking n+ 1 pe-
riods to trade with vL or taking n periods to trade with vL. Note that Equation 14
only depends on the policy for µm,m ≤ n, which has already been defined.
Lemma C.3 in the Appendix shows {µn}n≥0 is an increasing sequence. These
cutoffs are precisely those in the statement of Theorem 2. Indeed, we set Dn =
[µn, µn+1) for n ≥ 0 and µD∗(µ0) = µn−1 for µ0 ∈ Dn. The policy (τ
∗, q∗) satisfies
all the properties of Proposition 3. We verify in Section C.3 that it constitutes an
intrapersonal equilibrium. Uniqueness follows from the results in Appendix C
and Appendix III in Doval and Skreta (2019), and in particular, Proposition III.1,
where we show that although seller incarnations with beliefs {µn}n≥1 have mul-
tiple best responses, the one specified above is the only one that can be part of an
intrapersonal equilibrium.
Although the intrapersonal game has a unique equilibrium, the game between
the seller and the buyer does not (see Appendix V in Doval and Skreta (2019)).
This finding is a reflection of a deeper observation: we derived the intrapersonal
game from necessary conditions for revenue maximization, whereas not all equi-
libria in the game between the seller and the buyer give the seller his best equilib-
rium payoff.
Tie-breaking and upper semicontinuity: Before proceding with the construc-
tion of the PBE assessment, 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉, wemake a final observation about
the properties of the intrapersonal equilibrium. Figure 1 below illustrates that
when µ0 ∈ [µn, µn+1), the continuation values R
(τ∗ ,q∗)(·, µ0) fail to be upper semi-
continuous at beliefs {µk : k ≥ n+ 1}:
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29Lemma IV.2 in Doval and Skreta (2019) shows formally that upper semicontinuity fails at these
beliefs.
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µ′
δR(τ
∗,q∗)(·,µ0)
µ1 µ2 µ3 µ4
Figure 1: Illustration of the failure of upper-semicontinuity for µ0 ∈ [µ2, µ3): blue
empty circles indicate the discontinuity
Conceptually, the failure of upper semicontinuity illustrates that sellers with
different prior beliefs disagree about how ties should be broken. If µ0 ∈ [µn, µn+1),
the seller with belief µ0 finds that sellers with beliefs µk, k ≥ n+ 1 take too long
to trade with the buyer when her valuation is vL. However, inducing posteriors
greater than µn+1when µ0 < µn+1 is never optimal: anyweight on such posteriors
can be split between µn−1 and 1, which are the optimal choices for the seller when
his prior µ0 ∈ [µn, µn+1). This observation, together with the property that seller
incarnations with priors lower than µ0 break ties in favor of the seller with prior
µ0, guarantees an intrapersonal equilibrium exists.
Note that conflicts in tie-breaking are usually an issue for equilibrium existence
in the literature on intrapersonal games. A similar issue arises in sequential voting
games (see Duggan (2006) and the references therein). Two properties of our game
seem important in managing to sidestep these issues: (i) the agreement between
a seller with belief µ0 with how sellers with lower priors break ties, and (ii) the
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seller with belief µ0 ∈ [µn, µn+1) can always choose not to put a seller with belief
µ′ ≥ µn+1 on the move.
3.3 From the intrapersonal equilibrium to the PBE assessment
Section 3.3 describes how we use the intrapersonal equilibrium policy, (τ∗, q∗),
to construct an assessment, 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉, that gives the seller his highest
equilibrium payoff in G∞(µ0).
Theorem 2 delivers an allocation rule and a distribution over posteriors for each
prior belief the seller may hold. We now use the seller’s policy in the intrapersonal
equilibrium to construct a mapping, γ∗ : ∆(V) 7→ MC, that assigns a mechanism
to each belief the seller may have about the buyer (omitted details of this construc-
tion are in Section D.1). Given the seller’s prior, µ0, we can use the distribution
over posteriors, τ∗(µ0, ·), to construct a communication device β
∗
µ0
, which under
the assumption of truthtelling, implements the same distribution over posteriors
as τ∗. Indeed, if µ0 ∈ Dn,
β∗µ0(µn−1|vL) = 1 and β
∗
µ0
(µn−1|vH) =
µn−1τ
∗(µ0, µn−1)
µ0
.
Moreover, we can use the allocation rule q∗(µ0, ·) to construct the probability of
trade:
q∗µ0(µ
′) = q∗(µ0, µ
′) for µ′ ∈ {µn−1, 1}.
Finally, using Equations 3 and 4, we can use the allocation rule, q∗(µ0, ·), and the
communication device, β∗µ0 , to construct the transfers. Indeed, if µ0 ∈ Dn,
x∗µ0(µn−1) = 0 and x
∗
µ0
(1) = vL + (1− δ
n)∆v. (15)
The mapping γ∗ then maps each prior, µ0, to 〈(V, β
∗
µ0
,∆(V)), (q∗µ0(·), x
∗
µ0
(·))〉.
Moreover, we construct the buyer’s rents under this mechanism as a function of
the seller’s prior. Indeed, if µ0 ∈ Dn, the buyer’s continuation payoff when her
valuation is vH is given by:
u∗H(µ0) = δ
n∆v. (16)
To construct a PBE assessment, we need to specify the buyer’s and the seller’s
strategy after every history. We do so in Sections E.1 and E.2 in Appendix E. In
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particular, Section E.2 shows how to jointly construct a strategy for the seller, Γ∗,
and a system of beliefs, µ∗, such that after every history, the seller’s choice of
mechanism is determined by Γ∗(ht) = γ∗(µ∗(ht)). Moreover, µ∗(ht) is consistent
with the buyer’s strategy constructed in Section E.1.
The PBE assessment we construct has the following property at all histories ht. If
at history ht, the seller has beliefs µ∗(ht), the seller’s payoff is R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µ∗(ht), µ∗(ht))
and the buyer’s payoff is 0 if her valuation is vL and is u
∗
H(µ
∗(ht)) if her valuation
is vH (recall equation (16)). Section E.3 verifies that given these continuation pay-
offs, at history ht−1, neither the buyer nor the seller have a one-shot deviation from
the equilibrium strategy profile. In the language of Abreu et al. (1990), the strat-
egy at ht−1, together with the continuation payoffs at ht, decompose the payoffs at
ht−1. However, without knowing whether (R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µ∗(ht), µ∗(ht)), 0, u∗H(µ
∗(ht)))
is itself an equilibriumpayoff inG∞(µ∗(ht)), this is not enough to conclude 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉
is a PBE assessment.
In Doval and Skreta (2019), we lay out the definitions and statements needed to
show that self-generation techniques apply to our setting, so that the above steps
verify 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉 is a PBE assessment. Ours is a dynamic incomplete in-
formation game with persistent types, like the one studied in Athey and Bagwell
(2008).30 The authors show that under a restriction on the solution concept, which
they term Public PBE, equilibrium payoffs can be characterized using techniques
like in Abreu et al. (1990).31 More precisely, a Public PBE is a PBE assessment
where each player’s strategy depends on the public history of the game and their
current private information.
Although in general the set of Public PBE payoffs is a strict subset of the PBE
payoffs, it is not in the game we study.32 As we discussed in Section 3.1, it fol-
lows from Doval and Skreta (2018) that it is without loss of generality to focus on
PBE assessments where the buyer’s strategy depends only on her valuation and
the public history. Thus, self-generation techniques can be applied to our game
to characterize not only the seller’s best equilibrium payoff, but all equilibrium
payoffs in our game.
30To be sure, in Athey and Bagwell (2008), types are persistent, but not fully persistent as in our
game.
31Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) introduce similar techniques, but in dynamic games with full
support. That is, the information structure in the game is such that no player can infer from his
signal realizations that another player has deviated.
32Notwithstanding this difficulty, Athey and Bagwell (2008) show that, under some conditions,
the most collusive outcome can be achieved by using Public PBE strategy profiles.
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We close Section 3 by illustrating some qualitative features of the model by
means of pictures and discussing the case vL = 0:
Illustrations: Although the recursive nature of the equations defining the cut-
offs {µn}n≥0 make performing comparative statics somewhat difficult, in what
follows, we reproduce the price path and the seller’s payoff as a function of the
seller’s prior and the discount factor for a specific parameterization of the model.
In particular, the figures are plotted using vL = 1 and vH = 5 (which implies
µ1 = 0.2).
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Figure 2: Price dynamics as a function of seller’s prior – different discount
factors.
Figure 2 plots the price dynamics as a function of the discount factor.33 Note that
for low values of the discount factor (δ = 0.01 in blue), the solution is almost like
the commitment solution. In a sense, the seller’s impatience affords him commit-
ment power, so that he can keep the prices close to vH as long as his prior is above
µ1. At the other extreme, when the seller’s discount factor is high (δ = 0.99 in
33More precisely, Figure 2 plots the seller’s initial price offer as a function of his prior. Given the
structure of the PBE assessment that we characterize, the equilibrium price dynamics can be read
from the figure.
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purple), the logic behind the Coase conjecture applies and the seller quickly low-
ers the prices. As a consequence, the seller’s revenue is lower for higher discount
factors. We illustrate this in Figure 3:
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Figure 3: Seller’s payoff as a function of seller’s prior – different discount factors.
Figure 3 may give the impression that the seller’s revenue is monotonically de-
creasing in the discount factor for a given prior. It is not, however, as Figure 4
shows:
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Figure 4: Seller’s payoff as a function of the discount factor – different priors.
The case vL = 0 The case of vL = 0 shares features with the no gap case in
Ausubel and Deneckere (1989). The ‘no gap’ case refers to the possibility that the
seller’s value is above the lowest possible buyer’s value (in our case this means
vL ≤ 0). As we argue next, when vL = 0, the seller can sustain the full commit-
ment profit even with limited commitment.
In particular, at the seller optimal equilibrium revenue is µ0vH, regardless of
the discount factor (and not just in the limit as in Ausubel and Deneckere (1989)).
From the perspective of the intrapersonal equilibrium, regardless of his belief, µ0,
as long as µ0 > 0, the seller prefers that the seller with belief 0 breaks ties in favor
of no trade. In that case, each seller with belief µ0 > 0 can trade with maximal
probability with vH because the “threat” of no further trade is credible.
The reader may then be tempted to draw these conclusions more broadly. How-
ever, that the seller can achieve the commitment profits when vL = 0 for all dis-
count factors is an artifact of the binary case. With finitely many types, the lowest
of which is below 0, the seller would eventually trade with all positive ones in a
price-posting game. Thus, with finitely many types, the seller can always avoid
dropping the price below the smallest, yet positive, valuation.
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4 Conclusions and further directions
This paper makes two contributions to the literature on mechanism design with
limited commitment. First, we characterize the optimal mechanism for the sale
of a durable good when the seller has limited commitment and interacts with the
buyer for infinitely many periods and show that posted prices are optimal.
Second, we provide a recipe for solving problems of mechanism design with lim-
ited commitment with transferable utility, which applies to settings other than the
ones we study here. Indeed, the steps followed in the proof of our main result
closely follow the standard steps in classical mechanism design. To wit, the pro-
totypical procedure to analyze problems of mechanism design with commitment
and transferable utility follows these steps: (i) Apply the revelation principle to
simplify the space of mechanisms and the features of the agent’s strategy profile
(participation and truthtelling), (ii) appeal to quasilinearity and single-crossing to
derive an envelope representation of payoffs that replaces the transfers out of the
designer’s payoff, (iii) solve the designer’s decision problem, and (iv) verify that the
solution satisfies all constraints that (may) have been ignored.
Note that these steps are mainly the ones we followed in Section 3. Indeed,
thanks to the result in our previous work, Doval and Skreta (2018), we are able
to reduce the buyer’s behavior to a series of participation and truthtelling con-
straints, just as we do in the case of full commitment. The main difference is step
(iii): with limited commitment, the designer’s problem is an intrapersonal game.
This is a reflection of a deeper observation: optimal mechanisms under full com-
mitment often fail to be sequentially rational, whereas the best response condition
of the intrapersonal equilibrium captures the restrictions imposed by sequential
rationality on the designer’s behavior.
The analysis so far has focused on the case of binary valuations, which is con-
sistent with recent papers in the literature that studies infinite-horizon principal-
agent problemswith limited commitment, like Strulovici (2017) andGerardi and Maestri
(2018). The case of binary valuations allows us to bring to the forefront the con-
ceptual innovations that arise in an infinite horizon game between two long-run
players, where one of them, the seller, has a rich action space. Nevertheless, the
extension to the case in which buyer valuations are drawn from a continuum is of
interest, and we plan to address it in future work.
While the optimality of posted prices maybe specific to our setting, some of the
forces we illustrate in the paper are more broadly applicable. Indeed, the richer set
36
of mechanisms we endow the seller with allow him to design howmuch he learns
about the buyer’s type and also how to use this information (subject, of course, to
the buyer’s incentives). The seller’s ability to design his beliefs, and therefore, the
demand he faces is relevant in other settings, as is the case, for instance, when the
seller interacts repeatedly with the consumer across different transactions. While
our setting is not rich enough to capture some of the nuances introduced by re-
peated purchases, we believe that future work can leverage the framework we
have developed to study these issues.
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A Omitted formal statements and equations
A.1 Bayes’ rule where possible
In this section, we define formally what we mean by Bayes’ rule where possible
in Section 2. We do so using G∞(µ0), but it should be clear that the same applies
to G∞M(µ0). Note that in the game under consideration, the public history h
t rep-
resents an information set for the seller with nodes htB ∈ H
t
B(h
t). In what follows,
we use the notation y, y′ to denote nodes in the game.
Fix a strategy profile (Γ, (πv, rv)v∈V), and two nodes y and y
′ such that y pre-
cedes y′. We can use the strategy profile to define a probability, P(Γ,(πv,rv)v∈V)(y′|y),
of reaching node y′ conditional on being at node y. Extend this probability to all
nodes by making it 0 for nodes y′ that do not succeed y.
Say that information set ht precedes information set ht+1, or that ht, ht+1 are
consecutive information sets if there exists a mechanism, M, such that either of
the following hold:
(a) there is a posterior, µ′, such that ∑v∈V β
M(µ′|v) > 034 and
ht+1 = (ht,M, 1, µ′, (0, xM(µ′)),ωt+1), or
34In Doval and Skreta (2018), we argue that it is without loss of generality to prune from the tree
all histories that correspond to posteriors that cannot be generated with positive probability by the
mechanism.
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(b) ht+1 = (ht,M, 0,∅, (0, 0),ωt+1).
Fix an assessment, 〈Γ, (πv, rv)v∈V , µ〉, and two consecutive information sets h
t, ht+1.
Say that ht+1 is reached with positive probability from ht under 〈Γ, (πv, rv)v∈V , µ〉,
if
P〈Γ,(πv,rv)v∈V ,µ〉(ht+1|ht) ≡ ∑
y∈ht ,y′∈ht+1
µ∗(y|ht)P(Γ,(πv,rv)v∈V)(y′|y) > 0
Say that ht+1 can be reached from ht through a deviation by the seller if there exists
Γ′ such that P〈Γ
′,(πv,rv)v∈V ,µ〉(ht+1|ht) > 0.
Definition 4. An assessment 〈Γ, (πv, rv)v∈V , µ〉 satisfies Bayes’ rule where possible
if for all t ≥ 0 and for all consecutive ht, ht+1, µ(y′|ht+1) is obtained via Bayes’ rule
from µ(·|ht) and (Γ, (πv, rv)v∈V) if either
1. P〈Γ,(πv,rv)v∈V ,µ〉(ht+1|ht) > 0, or
2. ht+1 can be reached from ht through a deviation by the seller.
A.2 Participation, truthtelling, andBayes’ plausibility constraints
Lemma 1 implies that for any payoff (uS, uH , uL) ∈ E
∗(µ0), we can find a PBE
assessment, 〈Γ, (πv, rv)v∈V , µ〉, such that the following constraints are satisfied.
For each period t and each public history ht, the buyer must find it optimal to
participate in the mechanism chosen by the seller:
∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM
∗
t (µ′|v)(vqM
∗
t (µ′)− xM
∗
t (µ′) + (1− qM
∗
t (µ′))δUv(h
t,M∗t , 1, µ
′, (0, xM
∗
t )))
≥ δUv((h
t,M∗t ,∅, (0, 0))), (PCv,ht)
where we use Uv(ht+1) to denote the buyer’s continuation payoffs at history ht+1
when her valuation is v under strategy profile (Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V). Second, the buyer
must find it optimal to report her type truthfully. That is, for all v ∈ V and v′ 6= v,
we have that
∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM
∗
t (µ′|v)(vqM
∗
t (µ′)− xM
∗
t (µ′) + (1− qM
∗
t (µ′))δUv(h
t,M∗t , 1, µ
′, (0, xM
∗
t )))
≥ ∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM
∗
t (µ′|v′)(vqM
∗
t (µ′)− xM
∗
t (µ′) + (1− qM
∗
t (µ′))δUv(h
t,M∗t , 1, µ
′, (0, xM
∗
t ))).
(ICv,ht)
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Finally, if the mechanism outputs posterior µ′, it must be that
µ′[ ∑
v∈V
βM
∗
t (µ′|v)µ(ht)(v)] = µ(ht)βM
∗
t (µ′|vH). (BCµ(ht))
That is, from the communication device, we can infer a distribution over posteri-
ors τM
∗
t (µ(ht), ·) ∈ ∆(∆(V)) such that τM
∗
t (µ(ht), µ′) = ∑v∈V µ(h
t)(v)βM
∗
t (µ′|v).
B Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1: The proof of this part is immediate, and hence we omit it.
Part 2: For this proof, we rely on several facts and results in Doval and Skreta
(2019). First, by Proposition I.1, we know that if 〈Γ, (πv, rv)v∈V , µ〉 is a PBE
assessment of G∞(µ0), then the continuation payoffs at history h
t are equilib-
rium payoffs of G∞(µ(ht)). Second, because of the public randomization de-
vice, it is without loss of generality to assume that the seller does not randomize
his choice of mechanism. Let 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉 denote the PBE assessment
that gives the seller payoff u∗S(µ0). Toward a contradiction, suppose that h
t =
(ht−1,ω,Mt, 1, µ′, (0, xMt)) is a history on the path of play such that 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉|ht
is not incentive-efficient. Thus,U∗S(h
t) < max{uS : (uS,U
∗
H(h
t),U∗L(h
t)) ∈ E∗(µ∗(ht))}.
Then, there is a strategy profile in G∞(µ∗(ht)) that gives the seller a higher payoff
and the buyer the same payoff at ht. Consider thenmodifying 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉
at ht so that the latter strategy profile is used. Clearly, this increases the seller’s
payoff without changing the buyer’s payoff. Moreover, at history (ht−1,ω,Mt),
the buyer still has an incentive to participate and truthfully report her type, since
we have not modified her continuation payoffs in the mechanism. Finally, note
that at (ht−1,ω), the seller does not have an incentive to deviate: we have not
changed the buyer’s strategy at (ht−1,ω,M′t), for M
′
t 6= Mt. Therefore, since the
seller had no incentive to deviate in the original assessment, he also has no in-
centive to deviate at the new one. The new assessment is thus a PBE assessment
in G∞(µ0) and the seller obtains a higher payoff than u
∗
S(µ0), a contradiction.
35
Part 3: We first show that in the first period, vL has to be indifferent between par-
ticipating or not in the mechanism. Let U∗L(h
0,M∗0) denote the buyer’s equilib-
rium payoff at the initial history in the PBE when the seller offers mechanism
35Technically, we just showed that there cannot be a positive measure of realizations of the cor-
relating device for which 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V, µ
∗〉 is not incentive-efficient.
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M∗0 according to Γ
∗(h0). If U∗L(h
0,M∗0) > 0, consider the following modification
to the seller’s strategy profile. At the initial history, instead of offer mechanism
M∗0 , the seller offers mechanismM
′
0 that coincides with mechanismM
∗
0 ≡ Γ
∗(∅),
except that all transfers xM
∗
0(µ′) such that ∑v∈V β
M∗0 (µ′|v) > 0, they are raised by
U∗L(h
0,M∗0). Modify the buyer’s strategy at h
0 so that π∗v(h
0,M′0) = π
∗
v(h
0,M∗0)
and r∗v(h
0,M′0) = r
∗
v(h
0,M∗0); leave the buyer’s strategy everywhere else un-
changed. Finally, modify the seller’s beliefs so that when the buyer rejects M′0,
he assigns probability 1 to the buyer’s valuation being vH. It is standard to
check that the seller’s and buyer’s sequential rationality constraints hold36 and
the seller’s payoff increases by U∗L(h
0) > 0.
To see that part 3 holds after every history on the path of play, let ht denote the
shortest-length public history on the path of play such that a mechanism M∗t is
offered by the seller at ht such that U∗L(h
t,M∗t ) > 0. Following similar steps as
above, we can modify the mechanism at ht, so that the buyer’s payoff starting
from ht is 0 when her valuation is vL and the seller’s payoff at h
t goes up by
U∗L(h
t,M∗t ); adjusting the strategies of the buyer so that it is a best response to
participate and truthfully report her type in the modified mechanism. Letting
ht = (ht−1,M∗t−1, µ
′, 0, xM
∗
t−1(µ′)), modify M∗t−1 so that transfers are lowered by
δ(1 − qM
∗
t−1(µ′))U∗L(h
t, ·). Clearly, the change is revenue neutral for the seller,
it satisfies that U∗L(h
t, ·) = U∗L(h
t−1, ·) = 0, and it is standard to check that the
buyer’s incentives and payoffs remain unchanged.
Part 4: Let 〈Γ∗, (π∗v , r
∗
v)v∈V , µ
∗〉 denote the PBE assessment that delivers the high-
est payoff for the seller. Clearly, if the mechanism used in the initial history
satisfies that
|supp µ0(v)β
M∗0 (·|v)| = 1,
then the buyer is indifferent between reporting vL and vH at h
0.
Consider then the case in which |supp µ0(v)β
M∗0 (·|v)| > 1. Then, Bayes’ consis-
tency implies that two beliefs, µ′H , µ
′
L, exist such that β
M∗0 (µ′H |vH) > β
M∗0 (µ′H |vL)
36 Because the original assessment is a PBE, sequential rationality of the seller’s strategy profile
implies that he does not have an incentive to deviate to mechanisms different from M∗0 and M
′
0.
Clearly, given the buyer’s strategy profile, offering M′0 dominates offering M
∗
0 . As for the buyer,
note that conditional on participating in M′0, reporting her valuation truthfully is a best response
because it was a best response in the original PBE. Because in the new assessment, participat-
ing in M′0 yields a non-negative payoff for the buyer, whereas rejection guarantees a payoff of 0,
participating is a best response for the buyer.
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and βM
∗
0 (µ′L|vH) < β
M∗0 (µ′L|vL). Let ǫH = U
∗
H(h
0,M∗0) − U
∗
H|L(h
0,M∗0), where
U∗H(h
0,M∗0) denotes the equilibrium payoff of the high type at history h
0 and
U∗
H|L denotes the buyer’s payoff when her type is vH, she reports vL into the
mechanism M∗0 , and then plays according to her equilibrium strategy. By as-
sumption, ǫH > 0.
Then, define ∆µ′H
,∆µ′L
to be such that
βM
∗
0 (µ′H |vL)∆µ′H = β
M∗0 (µ′L|vL)∆µ′L ,
ǫH = β
M∗0 (µ′H |vH)∆µ′H
− βM
∗
0 (µ′L|vH)∆µ′L
.
Modify the transfers of mechanismM∗0 so that x
M′0(µ′L) = x
M∗0(µ′L)−∆µ′L , x
M′0(µ′H) =
xM
∗
0(µ′H)+∆µ′H
. Modify the buyer’s strategy at h0 so that π∗v(h
0,M′0) = π
∗
v(h
0,M∗0)
and r∗v(h
0,M′0, 1) = r
∗
v(h
0,M∗0 , 1); leave the buyer’s strategy everywhere else un-
changed. Finally, modify the seller’s beliefs so that when the buyer rejectsM′0, he
assigns probability 1 to the buyer’s valuation being vH. The seller’s revenue goes
up by µ0ǫH and the buyer’s best response is still to participate in the mechanism
and truthfully report her type.37
To see that along the path of play, vH must be indifferent between truthfully re-
porting and reporting vL, let h
t denote the shortest-length history on the path
of play such that the seller offers a mechanism M∗t such that the buyer strictly
prefers to report vH than to report vL when her type is vH.
38 As before, at least
two posteriors must be generated in the mechanism. Let ǫH(h
t) > 0 denote the
difference in payoffs between reporting vH and reporting vL. Following the con-
struction in the previous paragraph, modify the strategy profile at ht so that the
seller, instead of offering M∗t , offers the modified version M
′
t. Mechanism M
′
t is
asM∗t , except that the transfers have been modified as we did for the case t = 0,
so that the buyer is now indifferent between reporting vH and vL, when her val-
uation is vH. Modify the buyer’s strategy at h
t so that π∗v(h
t,M′t) = π
∗
v(h
t,M∗t )
and r∗v(h
t,M′t, 1) = r
∗
v(h
t,M∗t , 1); for now, leave the buyer’s strategy everywhere
37To see that participating with probability one and truthtelling are best responses for the buyer,
note that when the buyer announces vL, her expected payment (averaging out over posteriors) is
unchanged, whereas when she announces vH her expected payment goes up by ǫH . This means
that when her valuation is vH the buyer is now indifferent between reporting vL and vH , whereas
the buyer now has a strict incentive to report vL when her valuation is vL.
38Because without loss of generality we can focus on assessments where the buyer is truthful, if
she is not indifferent, she must strictly prefer to tell the truth.
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else unchanged. Finally, modify the seller’s beliefs so that when the buyer re-
jects M′t, he assigns probability 1 to the buyer’s valuation being vH. To keep
the incentives at the histories preceding ht the same, we proceed as follows. Let
ht = (ht−1,M∗t−1, 1, µ
′, (0, xM
∗
t−1(µ′))). Modify the strategy at ht−1 so that instead
of offering M∗t−1, the seller offers M
′
t−1. This mechanism coincides with M
∗
t−1
except that xM
∗
t−1(µ′) is lowered by ∆µ′ = δ(1− q
M∗t−1(µ′))ǫH(h
t). Note that this
is payoff neutral for the seller: his increase in payoff at (ht,M′t) is exactly offset
by his payoff decrease at ht−1, ∆µ′ . However, by lowering x
M∗t−1(µ′), we may
have relaxed the participation constraint of vL if 1− µ
∗(ht−1) > 0, in which case,
we increase all transfers by ǫL = β
M∗t (µ′|vL)∆µ′ > 0. Again, modify the buyer’s
strategy so that her best response at (ht−1,M′t−1) is the same as at (h
t−1,M∗t−1)
and modify the seller’s beliefs so that when the buyer rejects Mt−1, he assigns
probability 1 to the buyer’s valuation being vH. The best response conditions
from the original assessment imply the new assessment is also a PBE assessment.
In this new assessment, the seller’s payoff (weakly) increases, which contradicts
incentive efficiency if 1− µ∗(ht−1) > 0.
C Proofs of Section 3.2
Instead of proving Proposition 2, Proposition 3, and Theorem 2 chronologically, we
proceed as follows:
1. Proposition C.1 in Section C.1 shows that in any intrapersonal equilibrium
(a) If µ0 < µ1, then q(µ0, ·) = 1 (Proposition 2, Part 1)
(b) If µ0 > µ1, then
i. If the seller induces a posterior at which he sets q(µ0, µ
′) = 1, then
µ′ = 1
ii. The seller never induces a posterior in (µ0, 1).
2. Proposition C.2 shows that if there is an intrapersonal equilibrium such that
(a) If µ0 < µ1, then q(µ0, ·) = 1,
(b) For all µ0 ≥ µ1, there exists µD∗(µ0) < µ0 such that τ
∗(µ0, µD∗(µ0)) =
1− τ∗(µ0, 1) and q
∗(µ0, 1) = 1 = 1− q
∗(µ0, µD∗(µ0)).
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then it satisfies the properties stated in Proposition 3.
3. Theorem C.1 shows that the policy described in Theorem 2 is an intrapersonal
equilibrium.
To complete the proofs of the results in Section 3.2 it only remains to show that the
intrapersonal equilibrium is unique. This is done in Appendix III in Doval and Skreta
(2019). Section III.1 shows that there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller
uses at most two posteriors. Section III.2 shows that there is no equilibrium in
which the seller uses more than two posteriors.
C.1 Proof of Proposition C.1
Proposition C.1. Let 〈(τ∗, q∗), R(τ
∗ ,q∗)〉 be an intrapersonal equilibrium. Then,
1. For all µ0 < µ1, q
∗(µ0, ·) = 1,
2. For all µ0 > µ1, if q
∗(µ0, µ
′) = 1 and the seller induces µ′ with positive probability,
then µ′ = 1.
3. For all µ0 > µ1,
∫ 1
µ0
τ∗(µ0, dµ
′) = τ∗(µ0, 1).
The proof of Proposition C.1 uses the following lemma:
Lemma C.1 (Properties of the continuation values, R(τ,q) ). Let R(τ,q) denote the
continuation values induced by a policy (τ, q). Then,
1. If µ0 < µ1, then R
(τ,q)(µ′, µ0) ≤ µ
′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ0),
2. If µ0 > µ1, then R
(τ,q)(µ′, µ0) ≤ µ
′vH.
Proof. Note the contraction mapping theorem implies R(τ,q) is well defined for
any policy, (τ, q). Fix a prior µ0, and consider the operator Tµ0 that takes bounded
function w : ∆(V) 7→ R into
Tµ0(w)(µ
′) =
∫ (
q(µ′, µ˜)(µ˜vH + (1− µ˜)vˆL(µ0)) + (1− q(µ
′ , µ˜))δw(µ˜)
)
τ(µ′, dµ˜)
To show part 1 holds, let w be a bounded function such that w(µ˜) ≤ µ˜vH + (1−
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µ˜)vˆL(µ0). Then,
Tµ0(w(µ
′)) ≤
∫ (
q(µ′, µ˜)(µ˜vH + (1− µ˜)vˆL(µ0)) + (1− q(µ
′, µ˜))δ(µ˜vH + (1− µ˜)vˆL(µ0))
)
τ(µ′, dµ˜)
≤ µ′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ0),
where the inequalities follow from (i) the bound on w, (ii) vˆL(µ0) > 0, and (iii)
Bayes’ plausibility. This implies that for all µ′ ∈ ∆(V), R(τ,q)(µ′, µ0) ≤ µ
′vH +
(1− µ′)vˆL(µ0).
Similarly, to show part 2 holds, let w be a bounded function such that w(µ˜) ≤
µ˜vH. Then,
Tµ0(w(µ
′)) ≤
∫ (
q(µ′ , µ˜)(µ˜vH + (1− µ˜)vˆL(µ0)) + (1− q(µ
′, µ˜))δµ˜vH
)
τ(µ′, dµ˜)
≤ µ′vH ,
where the inequalities follow from (i) the bound on w, (ii) vˆL(µ0) < 0, and (iii)
Bayes’ plausibility. This implies that for all µ′ ∈ ∆(V), R(τ,q)(µ′, µ0) ≤ µ
′vH.
Proof of Proposition C.1. To prove part 1, note Lemma C.1 implies that
R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µ0, µ0) ≤ µ0vH + (1− µ0)vˆL(µ0),
and this bound is achieved by setting q∗(µ0, ·) = 1.
To prove part 2, note that whenever µ0 > µ1, for any posterior µ
′ it follows that
µ′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ0) < µ
′vH + (1− µ
′)δvˆL(µ0), (C.1)
because vˆL(µ0) < 0 and δ < 1. Thus, instead of setting q
∗(µ0, µ
′) = 1, which yields
the payoff on the left-hand side of Equation C.1, the seller can split µ′ between 0
and 1, setting q∗(µ0, 1) = 1 = 1− q
∗(µ0, 0), which yields the payoff on the right-
hand side of Equation C.1.
To prove part 3, let A = (µ0, 1) and suppose that
∫
A τ
∗(µ0, dµ
′) > 0. Then,∫
A
δR(τ
∗,q∗)(µ′, µ0)τ
∗(µ0, dµ
′) ≥
∫
A
R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µ′, µ0)τ
∗(µ0, dµ
′),
otherwise, the seller with prior µ0 would be better off by generating µ
′ ∈ A and
imitating at that point the policy that the seller with belief µ′ uses (rather than
generating µ′ and q∗(µ0, µ
′) = 0, which has payoff R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µ′, µ0).
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Since A has positive measure under τ∗(µ0, ·), it follows that the set of posteriors
µ′ > µ0 such that R
(τ∗ ,q∗)(µ′, µ0) ≤ 0 has positive measure. For any such posterior
µ′, we have:
µ′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ0) ≤ δR
(τ∗ ,q∗)(µ′, µ0) ≤ 0,
where the first inequality follows because it has to be that the seller prefers to
induce µ′ and set q∗(µ0, µ
′) = 0 over q∗(µ0, µ
′) = 1. Since µ0 < µ
′, we then have
vL ≡ µ0vH + (1− µ0)vˆL(µ0) < µ
′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ0) ≤ 0,
a contradiction. Thus, it cannot be that τ∗(µ0, A) > 0, which completes the proof.
C.2 Proof of Proposition C.2
Proposition C.2. Suppose 〈µD∗ , R
µD∗ 〉 is an intrapersonal equilibrium with the proper-
ties that:
1. For all µ0 < µ1, q
∗(µ0, µ
′) = 1 for all µ′ ∈ ∆(V).
2. For all µ0 ≥ µ1, there exists µD∗(µ0) < µ0 such that τ
∗(µ0, µD∗(µ0)) = 1−
τ∗(µ0, 1) and q
∗(µ0, 1) = 1 = 1− q
∗(µ0, µD∗(µ0)).
Then, it satisfies parts 1-4 of Proposition 3.
Part 1: Note that if µD∗ ≡ µD∗(µ0) < µ1, then R
µD∗ (µD∗ , µ0) = (1− µD∗)vˆL(µ0) +
µD∗vH. Consider the following alternative policy for µ0, where µD′(µ0) = 0. This
is achieved by τ′(µ0, 1) = τ
∗(µ0, 1) + µD∗ and τ
′(µ0, 0) = 1− τ
∗(µ0, 1) − µD∗ ,
where τ∗(µ0, ·) are the weights on µD∗ and 1 in the original best response. The
difference in payoffs is given by:
µD∗vH + (1− τ
∗(µ0, 1))δ[vˆL(µ)− µD∗vH − (1− µD∗)vˆL(µ0)]− µD∗δvˆL(µ0) =
= µD∗vH + (1− τ
∗(µ0, 1)δµD∗ [vˆL(µ0)− vH]− µD∗δvˆL(µ)
= µD∗(vH − δvˆL(µ0))− (1− τ
∗(µ0, 1))µD∗δ(vH − vˆL(µ0))
= µD∗vH(1− τ
∗(µ0, 1)δ)− µD∗δvˆL(µ0)τ
∗(µ0, 1) > 0,
where the last inequality follows from noting vˆL(µ0) < 0. This contradicts that
µD∗(µ0) is a best response. Hence, part 1 holds.
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Part 2: Let µ1 ≤ µ0 denote the seller’s prior. Toward a contradiction, assume that
for all finite n, µn = µ
(n)
D∗ (µ0) > µ1. Fix ǫ > 0. Note that there exists Mǫ such that
for all Mǫ ≤ m, we have
µm − µm+1 < ǫ(1− µm+1), (C.2)
so that as m goes to infinity, the seller puts smaller weight on posterior 1. To see
that Equation C.2 holds, assume to the contrary that for all m, we have
ǫ(1− µm+1) ≤ µm − µm+1.
Adding up from m = 0 to m = N − 1, we obtain
ǫ
N
∑
i=1
(1− µi) ≤ µ0 − µN. (C.3)
Now, the right-hand side of Equation C.3 is bounded above by µ0 − µ1 because
µ1 < µN. The left-hand side of Equation C.3 is bounded below by Nǫ(1 − µ0)
because µ0 ≥ µi for all i ≥ 0. We then obtain the following chain of inequalities:
Nǫ(1− µ0) < ǫ
N
∑
i=1
(1− µi) ≤ µ0 − µN < µ0 − µ1,
and this cannot possibly hold for all N. Thus, Equation C.2 holds.
Now fix ǫ > 0 such that
ǫ
1− δ(1− ǫ)
< µ1(1− δ). (C.4)
Note the right-hand side of Equation C.4 is bounded above by µm(1− δ) for all
m ≥ 0. Take Mǫ ≤ m and note
RµD∗ (µm, µm) < ǫvH + (1− ǫ)δR
µD∗ (µm+1, µm). (C.5)
To see that Equation C.5 holds, note
RµD∗ (µm, µm) =
µm − µm+1
1− µm+1
vH +
1− µm
1− µm+1
δRµD∗ (µm+1, µm)
=
µm − µm+1
1− µm+1
(vH − δR
µD∗ (µm+1, µm)) + δR
µD∗ (µm+1, µm)
< ǫvH + (1− ǫ)δR
µD∗ (µm+1, µm),
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where the inequality follows from vH > δR
µD∗ (µm+1, µm) and Mǫ ≤ m. Because
Equation C.5 holds for all Mǫ ≤ m, applying it recursively, we obtain
RµD∗ (µm, µm) <
vHǫ
1− δ(1− ǫ)
+ lim
N→∞
(δ(1− ǫ))NRµD∗ (µm+N, µm) =
vHǫ
1− δ(1− ǫ)
,
because RµD∗ (·, µm) is bounded and δ(1− ǫ) < 1. Now, the following policy is
always feasible for µm: place probability µm on 1 and 1− µm on 0. This yields
µm(1− δ)vH + vLδ,
when µ1 > 0 and
µmvH,
when µ1 = 0. Suppose 0 < µ1 (the other case is similar). Because splitting
between 0 and 1 is not optimal, we must have
µm(1− δ)vH + vLδ ≤ R
µD∗ (µm, µm) <
ǫ
1− δ(1− ǫ)
vH < vH(1− δ)µ1,
where the last inequality follows from Equation C.4. This is a contradiction to
〈µD∗ , R
µD∗ 〉 being an intrapersonal equilibrium. Thus, starting from µ0, a finite
N exists such that µ
(N)
D∗ (µ0) ≤ µ1.
Lemma C.2 below is used to show that if an intrapersonal equilibrium like the
one described in Proposition C.2 exists, then it satisfies part 3 of Proposition 3,
and it is the first step in the induction in the proof that it also satisfies part 4:
Lemma C.2. Let µ1 < µ0 < µ
′′
0 be such that µD∗(µ0) = µD∗(µ
′′
0 ) = 0. Then, for all
µ′0 ∈ (µ0, µ
′′
0 ), µD∗(µ
′
0) = 0.
Proof. Suppose µ0 < µ
′
0 < µ
′′
0 are such that µD∗(µ0) = µD∗(µ
′′
0 ) = 0, µD ≡
µD∗(µ
′
0) ≥ µ1.
39 Then, the following must be true:
µ′0 − µD
1− µD
vH +
1− µ′0
1− µD
δRµD∗ (µD , µ
′
0) ≥ µvH + (1− µ
′
0)δvˆL(µ
′
0).
Rewriting the above expression, we obtain:
g(µ′0) ≡
[
µ′0 − µD
1− µD
− µ′0
]
vH +
1− µ′0
1− µD
δRµD∗ (µD , µ
′
0) + (1− µ
′
0)δ(−vˆL(µ
′
0)) ≥ 0.
(C.6)
39By Proposition C.2, part 1, if µD(µ
′
0) 6= 0, then µD(µ
′
0) ≥ µ1.
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In Section IV.1 in Doval and Skreta (2019), we show the continuation values RµD∗
can be written as:
RµD∗ (µD, µ
′
0) = vH (
µD − µ1
1− µ1
+ (1− µD)
ND−1
∑
i=1
δi
1− µi
µi − µi+1
1− µi+1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
α(µD)
+ (1− µD)δ
ND︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ(µD)
vˆL(µ
′
0),
where µ1 > µ2 > · · · > µND−1 ≥ µ1 > 0 = µND are the posteriors generated
by the policy at which trade is delayed. Note RµD∗ (µD, µ
′
0) is differentiable in µ
′
0
and
∂
∂µ
RµD∗ (µD , µ)|µ=µ′0 = −γ(µD)
∆v
(1− µ′0)
2
.
Therefore, g is differentiable with respect to µ′0, and we obtain the following ex-
pression for g′(µ′0):
g′(µ′0) =
µD
1− µD
vH −
δRµD∗ (µD, µ
′
0)
1− µD
+ δvˆL(µ
′
0) + δ(1− µ
′
0)
[
1−
γ(µD)
1− µD
]
∆v
(1− µ′0)
2
= vH
µD
1− µD
−
δ
1− µD
(α(µD)vH + γ(µD)vˆL(µ
′
0)) + δvˆL(µ
′
0) + δ
∆v
1− µ′0
[
1−
γ(µD)
1− µD
]
= vH
[
µD − δα(µD)
1− µD
]
+ δ
(
vˆL(µ
′
0) +
∆v
1− µ′0
)[
1−
γ(µD)
1− µD
]
= vH
[
µD − δα(µD)
1− µD
]
+ δvH
[
1−
γ(µD)
1− µD
]
.
Now, note α(µD) ≤ µD. Intuitively, the largest probability that µD can trade with
vH is µD. To see this formally, we use that
40
α(µD) =
µD − µ1
1− µ1
+ (1− µD)
ND−1
∑
i=1
δi
1− µi
µi − µi+1
1− µi+1
≤
µD − µ
1
1− µ1
+ (1− µD)
µ1
1− µ1
ND−1
∑
i=1
δi,
where the inequality follows from noting that the expression inside the sum is
increasing in µi and decreasing in µi+1, and that µD−µ1+(1−µD)µ1 ∑
ND−1
i=1 δi ≤
µD(1− µ1).
40See Section IV.1 in Doval and Skreta (2019).
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It then follows that g′(µ′0) ≥ 0, which contradicts that µ
′′
0 finds it optimal to set
µD∗(µ
′′) = 0.
Part 3: We use the following property of a policy where µD∗(·) is weakly increas-
ing. If we let Nµ0 denote the smallest value of n such that µ
(n)
D∗ (µ0) ≤ µ1, then
Nµ0 is weakly increasing in µ0.
41 To see this, let µ0 < µ
′
0, and inductively
define µi+1 = µD∗(µi) and similarly, µ
′
i+1 = µD∗(µ
′
i). Clearly, we have that
µ0 > µ1 > · · · > µN > . . . and similarly, µ
′
0 > µ
′
1 > · · · > µ
′
N > . . . . Moreover,
monotonicity implies µ1 = µD∗(µ0) ≤ µ
′
1 = µD∗(µ
′
0) and inductively µN < µ
′
N .
Lemma C.2 implies that if µD∗(µ
′
N) = 0, then letting n be the smallest m such
that µm ≤ µ′N, we have µD∗(µm) = 0. Hence, Nµ0 ≤ Nµ′0 .
Let µ0 denote the smallest prior above µ1 such that there exists µ
′
0 > µ0 with
µD∗(µ0) > µD∗(µ
′
0).
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Now consider a policy for µ0 that splits theweight τ(µ0, µD∗(µ0)) between µD∗(µ
′
0)
and 1. The payoff from this policy is:
vH
[
µ0 − µD∗(µ0)
1− µD∗(µ0)
+
1− µ0
1− µD∗(µ0)
µD∗(µ0)− µD∗(µ
′
0)
1− µD∗(µ
′
0)
]
+ δ
1− µ0
1− µD∗(µ
′
0)
RµD∗ (µD∗(µ
′
0), µ0).
Consider the difference between the payoff of the above policy and that of the
policy that the seller employs when his prior is µ0:
1− µ0
1− µD∗(µ0)
µD∗(µ0)− µD∗(µ
′
0)
1− µD∗(µ′0)
vH + δ
1− µ0
1− µD∗(µ′0)
RµD∗ (µD∗(µ
′
0), µ0)
− δ
1− µ0
1− µD∗(µ0)
RµD∗ (µD∗(µ0), µ0). (C.7)
Optimality of µ′0’s policy implies
µ′0 − µD∗(µ
′
0)
1− µD∗(µ′0)
vH + δ
1− µ′0
1− µD∗(µ′0)
RµD∗ (µD∗(µ
′
0), µ
′
0)
≥
µ′0 − µD∗(µ0)
1− µD∗(µ0)
vH + δ
1− µ′0
1− µD∗(µ0)
RµD∗ (µD∗(µ0), µ
′
0),
or, equivalently,
δ[
RµD∗ (µD∗(µ
′
0), µ
′
0)
1− µD∗(µ′0)
−
RµD∗ (µD∗(µ0), µ0)
1− µD∗(µ0)
] ≥ −
(µD∗(µ0)− µD∗(µ
′
0))
(1− µD∗(µ0))(1− µD∗(µ′0))
vH .
41Proposition C.2 implies µD∗(µ
(Nµ0−1)
D∗ ) = 0.
42Note µ0 > µ1 because we know µD∗(µ1) = 0.
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To show µ0 can improve by using the new policy, we only need to show
RµD∗ (µD∗(µ
′
0), µ0)
1− µD∗(µ
′
0)
−
RµD∗ (µD∗(µ0), µ0)
1− µD∗(µ0)
≥
RµD∗ (µD∗(µ
′
0), µ
′
0)
1− µD∗(µ
′
0)
−
RµD∗ (µD∗(µ0), µ
′
0)
1− µD∗(µ0)
⇔
(δ
NµD∗ (µ
′
0) − δ
NµD∗ (µ0))(−vˆL(µ0)) ≤ (δ
NµD∗ (µ
′
0)) − δ
NµD∗ (µ0))(−vˆL(µ
′
0)),
where recall that N· denotes the first time at which updating leads to a poste-
rior below µ1 for a given prior. Note that a sufficient condition for the above
inequality to hold is that NµD∗ (µ′0)
< NµD∗ (µ0). That this is indeed the case follows
from the observation before the proof because the policy below µ0 (and hence for
µD∗(µ0), µD∗(µ
′
0)) satisfies monotonicity.
BecauseNµD∗ (µ′0)
< NµD∗ (µ0) implies the expression in Equation C.7 is non-negative,
we see that without loss of generality, we can have µD∗(µ0) ≤ µD∗(µ
′
0) and
strictly so when NµD∗ (µ0) 6= NµD∗ (µ′0).
Part 4: The proof is by induction on n ≥ 1. Define D0 = {0}, and for n ≥ 1,
Dn = {µ0 : µ
(n)
D∗ = 0},
to be the set of priors, µ0, such that the seller updates his prior to 0 in n periods
when his prior is µ0. Let P(n) denote the following inductive statement:
P(n): If µ0, µ
′
0 ∈ Dn, then µD∗(µ0) = µD∗(µ
′
0) ∈ Dn−1.
Lemma C.2 implies the inductive statement is true for n = 1, i.e., P(1) = 1.
Suppose P(n) = 1, and we show that P(n + 1) = 1. Let µ0, µ
′
0 ∈ Dn+1 and
assume without loss of generality that µ0 < µ
′
0. Toward a contradiction, suppose
µD∗(µ0) 6= µD∗(µ
′
0); by part 3, it follows that µD∗(µ0) < µD∗(µ
′
0). The payoff for
the seller when his prior is µ′0 from following his policy is
µ′0 − µD∗(µ
′
0)
1− µD∗(µ
′
0)
vH + δ
1− µ′0
1− µD∗(µ
′
0)
[
µD∗(µ
′
0)− µn−1
1− µn−1
vH + δ
1− µD∗(µ
′
0)
1− µn−1
RµD∗ (µn−1, µ
′
0)
]
,
where µn−1 = µD∗(µD∗(µ
′
0)). By the inductive hypothesis, µD∗(µD∗(µ
′
0)) =
µD∗(µD∗(µ0)) = µn−1.
Instead, if the seller follows µ0’s policy when his posterior is µ
′
0, his payoff would
be
µ′0 − µD∗(µ0)
1− µD∗(µ0)
vH + δ
1− µ′0
1− µD∗(µ0)
[
µD∗(µ0)− µn−1
1− µn−1
vH + δ
1− µD∗(µ0)
1− µn−1
RµD∗ (µn−1, µ
′
0)
]
,
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where we use the inductive statement that µD∗(µ0), µD∗(µ
′
0) ∈ Dn−1 and hence
µD∗(µD∗(µ0)) = µD∗(µD∗(µ
′
0)) = µn−1.
Taking differences, we have:
vH
[
µ′0 − µD∗(µ
′
0)
1− µD∗(µ′0)
+ δ
1− µ′0
1− µD∗(µ′0)
µD∗(µ
′
0)− µn−1
1− µn−1
−
µ′0 − µD∗(µ0)
1− µD∗(µ0)
− δ
1− µ′0
1− µD∗(µ0)
µD∗(µ0)− µn−1
1− µn−1
]
=
vH(1− µ
′
0)
(1− µD∗(µ0))(1− µD∗(µ′0))
(
(δ− 1)(µD∗(µ
′
0)− µD∗(µ0))
)
< 0,
which contradicts the optimality of µ′0’s policy. Thus, µD∗(µ0) = µD∗(µ
′
0) (by
part 3 we cannot have µD∗(µ
′
0) < µD∗(µ0)). Hence, P(n+ 1) = 1.
C.3 Proof of Theorem C.1
Theorem C.1. The policy described in Theorem 2 defines an intrapersonal equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem C.1. As in the proof of Proposition C.2, define
Dn = {µ0 : µ
(n)
D∗ (µ0) = 0},
to be the set of seller priors such that trade with vL happens in n periods.
The proof of Theorem C.1 is structured as follows. First, Lemma C.3 shows the
cutoffs {µn}n≥0 form a strictly increasing sequence. Second, we construct the pay-
offs from (τ∗, q∗). Finally, we show 〈(τ∗, q∗), R(τ
∗ ,q∗)〉 is an intrapersonal equilib-
rium.
Lemma C.3. The sequence {µn}n≥0 is strictly increasing in n for n ≥ 1.
Proof. Recall that we are defining µ0 = 0 and µ1 = vL/vH . Now let n ≥ 1 and let
µn ∈ Dn and µn−1 ∈ Dn−1. Fix a prior, µ0 ≥ µn. We claim that the difference
∆n(µ0; µn, µn−1) =
[
µ0 − µn
1− µn
vH +
1− µ0
1− µn
δRµD∗ (µn, µ0)
]
−
[
µ0 − µn−1
1− µn−1
vH +
1− µ0
1− µn−1
δRµD∗ (µn−1, µ0)
]
,
is increasing in µ0 for any monotone simple policy µD∗ .
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The proof follows similar steps to those in the proof of Lemma C.2. The argu-
ments in that proof imply ∆n is differentiable in µ0. Then,
∂
∂µ0
∆n(µ0; µn, µn−1) =
=
vH(µn − µn−1)
(1− µn)(1− µn−1)
− δ[
RµD∗ (µn, µ0)
1− µn
−
RµD∗ (µn−1, µ0)
1− µn−1
] + δ(1− µ0)[δ
n−1− δn]
∆v
(1− µ0)2
=
vH(µn − µn−1)
(1− µn)(1− µn−1)
− δ[
vHα(µn)
1− µn
−
vHα(µn−1)
1− µn−1
] + δvˆL(µ0)(δ
n−1− δn) + δ[δn−1− δn]
∆v
(1− µ0)
=
vH(µn − µn−1)
(1− µn)(1− µn−1)
− δvH[
µn − µn−1
(1− µn)(1− µn−1)
] + δ(δn−1− δn)vH > 0,
where the last equality follows from using the definition of α(·).
Now recall Equation 14, which we reproduce below for easy reference:
µn+1− µn
1− µn
vH +
1− µn+1
1− µn
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µn, µn+1) =
µn+1− µn−1
1− µn−1
vH +
1− µn+1
1− µn−1
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µn−1, µn+1).
Note that the cutoff µn+1 is defined by ∆n(µn+1; µn, µn−1) = 0.
Note that µn+1 6= µn if n ≥ 1. If µn = µn+1, then
0 = ∆n(µn+1; µn, µn−1) = δR
(τ∗ ,q∗)(µn, µn)− R
(τ∗,q∗)(µn, µn) ≤ 0,
a contradiction, unless δ = 1. Because ∆n(·; µn, µn−1) is increasing, µn+1 > µn.
This completes the proof.
An implication of Lemma C.3 is that µn+1 = inf{µ0 : µ0 ∈ Dn+1} = sup{µ0 :
µ0 ∈ Dn}. The equilibrium we construct makes it so that µn+1 = min{µ0 : µ0 ∈
Dn+1}.
Given (τ∗, q∗) as in the statement of Theorem 2, we construct the continuation
payoffs, R(τ
∗ ,q∗), for the seller for each of his priors, µ0, and posteriors he may
induce, µ′. If µ′ < µ1,
R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µ′, µ0) = µ
′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ0), (C.8)
whereas if µ′ ∈ [µn, µn+1) for n ≥ 1, we have
R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µ′, µ0) =
µ′ − µn−1
1− µn−1
vH + δ
1− µ′
1− µn−1
R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µn−1, µ0) (C.9)
R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µn, µ0) = vH
[
µn − µn−1
1− µn−1
+ (1− µn)
n−1
∑
i=1
δn−i
1− µi
µi − µi−1
1− µi−1
]
+ δn(1− µn)vˆL(µ0)
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Wenow verify that for each µ0 ≥ µ1, 〈τ
∗(µ0, ·)q
∗(µ0, ·)〉, is optimal given R
(τ∗ ,q∗)(·, µ0).
Recall that given R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(·, µ0), the seller solves:
max
τ,q
∫ 1
0
[q(µ0, µ
′)(µ′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ0)) + δ(1− q(µ0, µ
′))R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µ′, µ0)]dτ(µ0, µ
′)
(C.10)
subject to the constraints that q(µ0, µ
′) ∈ [0, 1] and
∫ 1
0 µ
′dτ(µ0, µ
′) = µ0.
Consider first the case in which µ0 = µ1. Note that µ
′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ1) =
µ′vH ≥ δR
(τ∗ ,q∗)(µ′, µ1) = δα(µ
′)vH strictly so when µ
′
> 0. Thus, q∗(µ1, µ
′) =
1, except possibly at µ = 0. Moreover, the payoff of setting q∗(µ1, 0) = 0 and
q∗(µ1, 1) = 1 (and splitting beliefs in this way) equals µ1vH and is exactly the
same as the payoff of setting q∗(µ1, ·) = 1 everywhere. Thus, τ
∗(µ1, 0) = 1− µ1 =
1− τ∗(µ1, 1) is optimal.
Consider next µ0 ∈ Dn for n ≥ 1, if n = 1, then µ0 > µ1. Part 3 of Proposition C.1
implies that the seller never places positive probability on (µ0, 1). Moreover,
Proposition C.2 implies that τ(µ0, ·) has finite support since it cannot assign posi-
tive probability to two posteriors µ′1, µ
′
2 ∈ Dm for some m ≤ n. It also implies that
if µ′ ∈ Dm and τ(µ0, µ
′) > 0, then µ′ = µm. Finally, it must be that τ(µ0, µn) = 0
in a best response. By definition, if µ0 ∈ Dn, then ∆n(µ0; µn, µn−1) < 0.
We now show that
µ0 − µn−1
1− µn−1
vH +
1− µ0
1− µn−1
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µn−1, µ0) ≥ τ(µ0, 1)vH +
n−1
∑
m=0
τ(µ0, µm)δR
(τ∗ ,q∗)(µm, µ0)
(C.11)
for any τ(µ0, ·) ∈ ∆(V) such that
supp τ(µ0, ·) ⊂ {µ0, . . . , µn−1, 1}
τ(µ0, 1) +
n−1
∑
m=0
τ(µ0, µm)µm = µ0.
Using the properties of τ(µ0, ·), one canwrite the RHS of Equation C.11 as follows:
vH
[
µ0 − µn−1+ ∑
n−2
m=0 τ(µ0, µm)(µn−1− µm)
1− µn−1
]
+ δ
1− µ0
1− µn−1
R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µn−1, µ0)
+
n−2
∑
m=0
τ(µ0, µm)(1− µm)
[
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µm, µ0)
1− µm
−
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µn−1, µ0)
1− µn−1
]
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Thus, to show that Equation C.11 holds, we need to show that
n−2
∑
m=0
τ(µ0, µm)(1− µm)
[
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µn−1, µ0)
1− µn−1
−
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µm, µ0)
1− µm
−
vH(µn−1− µm)
(1− µn−1)(1− µm)
]
≥ 0
(C.12)
That Equation C.12 holds follows from the following observation. For all m ≤
n− 1:
µm − µm−1
1− µm
vH +
1− µm
1− µm−1
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µm−1, µ0) =
=
µm − µm−1
1− µm−1
vH +
1− µm
1− µm−1
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µm−1, µm) + δ
m(vˆL(µ0)− vˆL(m))
=
µm − µm−2
1− µm−2
vH +
1− µm
1− µm−2
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µm−2, µm) + δ
m(vˆL(µ0)− vˆL(m))
=
µm − µm−2
1− µm−2
vH +
1− µm
1− µm−2
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µm−2, µ0) + δ
m−1(vˆL(m)− vˆL(µ0)) + δ
m(vˆL(µ0)− vˆL(m))
=
µm − µm−2
1− µm−2
vH +
1− µm
1− µm−2
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µm−2, µ0) + δ
m−1(vˆL(m)− vˆL(µ0))(1− δ),
where the third line uses the indifference condition that defines µm. This is if, and
only if, for all m ≤ n− 1
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µm−1, µ0)
1− µm−1
−
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µm−2, µ0)
1− µm−2
≥ vH
(µm−1 − µm−2)
(1− µm−2)(1− µm−1)
. (C.13)
Note that the inequality is strict whenever m < n − 1. Successive application of
Equation C.13 implies that Equation C.12 holds. Indeed, this can be verified by
writing the term inside the summation in Equation C.12 as:
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µn−1, µ0)
1− µn−1
−
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µm, µ0)
1− µm
=
n−2
∑
l=m
(
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µl+1, µ0)
1− µl+1
−
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µl, µ0)
1− µl
)
,
noting that Equation C.13 implies that the RHS of the above expression is bounded
below by
n−2
∑
l=m
vH(µl+1− µl)
(1− µl+1)(1− µl)
= vH
µn−1− µm
(1− µm)(1− µn−1)
.
This completes the proof.
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D Collected objects from intrapersonal equilibrium
In this section, we construct the following objects using the ingredients from the
intrapersonal equilibrium:
1. The mapping γ∗ : ∆(V) 7→ MC that associates to each belief the seller may
hold, µ0, a mechanism γ
∗(µ0) ∈ MC,
2. The mapping u∗H : ∆(V) 7→ R that associates to each belief the seller may
hold, µ0, the buyer’s payoff when her valuation is vH and the seller employs
the mechanism derived from the intrapersonal equilibrium,
3. The correspondence U ∗H : ∆(V) ⇒ R that associates to each belief the seller
may hold, µ0, the set of feasible buyer’s payoffs when her valuation is vH , the
seller employs the mechanism derived from the intrapersonal equilibrium,
but does not necessarily break ties as in the intrapersonal equilibrium. That
is, U ∗H(µ0) = u
∗
H(µ0) whenever µ0 6= µi, i = 0, 1, . . . .
D.1 Mechanism and buyer’s payoffs in the intrapersonal equi-
librium
In this section, we construct the transfers and the continuation rents for the buyer,
when her type is vH, implied by the intrapersonal equilibrium. (The communica-
tion device and the probability of trade are the ones specified in Section 3.3.) We
proceed “backwards,” starting from µ0 < µ1 and then µ0 ∈ Dn for n ≥ 1.
Let µ0 < µ1. Using the binding participation constraint for the buyer when her
type is vL, we have
x∗µ0(µ0) = vL.
Note that the utility of the buyer of type vH when the seller has belief µ0 < µ1 is
u∗H(µ0) = ∆v.
Fix n ≥ 1. Consider now µ0 ∈ [µn, µn+1). Using the binding participation
constraint for the buyer when her valuation is vL, we have
x∗µ0(µn−1) = 0.
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To determine x∗µ0(1), we use the incentive compatibility constraint for the high
type:
β∗µ0(1|vH)(vH − x
∗
µ0
(1)) + β∗µ0(µn−1|vH)δu
∗
H(µn−1) = δu
∗
H(µn−1)
x∗µ0(1) = vH − δu
∗
H(µn−1).
We then construct x∗µ0(1) recursively. Set n = 1. Then, for µ ∈ [µ1, µ2),
x∗µ0(1) = vH − δ∆v = vL + (1− δ)∆v
u∗H(µ0) = δ∆v,
and for n ≥ 2, we obtain that for µ0 ∈ [µn, µn+1),
x∗µ0(1) = vH − δ
n∆v = vL + (1− δ
n)∆v
u∗H(µ0) = δ
n∆v.
Note the construction of the transfers highlights that if the seller posts a price of
x∗µ0(1) when his belief is µ0, the buyer, when her type is vH, is indifferent between
accepting this price and rejecting it; whereas the low type is always better off
rejecting this price because it lies above vL.
Summing up, the intrapersonal equilibrium determines a map γ∗ : ∆(V) 7→
MC such that
γ∗(µ0) = 〈(V, β
∗
µ0
,∆(V)), (q∗µ0 , x
∗
µ0
)〉. (D.1)
The buyer’s payoffs when her valuation is vH are given by:
u∗H(µ0) = δ
i∆v, µ0 ∈ Di, i = 0, . . . .
Let U ∗H denote the following correspondence:
U ∗H(µ0) =
{
u∗H(µ0) if µ0 6= µi, i ≥ 1[
δi∆v, δi−1∆v
]
if µ0 = µi
. (D.2)
For future use, note U ∗H is upper-hemicontinuous, convex-valued, and compact-
valued.
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E Proofs of Section 3.3
Appendix E is organized in three parts. Section E.1 constructs the buyer’s strat-
egy profile so as to specify her best responses after every history in the game.
Section E.2 performs the same exercise for the seller, using the strategy from the
intrapersonal equilibrium (recall Equation D.1). Finally, in Section E.3, we show
that if continuation values are specified as in the intrapersonal equilibrium, and
the buyer’s strategy is completed as in the first step, the seller has no one-shot de-
viations from the equilibrium strategy. We also argue the buyer has no one-shot
deviations. Appendix I in Doval and Skreta (2019) lays out the formalisms that
justify the use of self-generation arguments in our setting; this, in turn, implies
that guaranteeing the absence of one-shot deviations given the continuation val-
ues is enough to conclude we have indeed constructed a PBE of G∞(µ0), which
gives the seller the same payoff as in the intrapersonal equilibrium.
E.1 Completing the buyer’s strategy
Fix a public history ht and let µ0 denote the seller’s beliefs at that public history.
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To complete the buyer’s strategy, we classify mechanisms,M, in four categories:44
0. Mechanisms that given the intrapersonal equilibrium continuation values
satisfy participation and truthtelling, that is,M such that the following hold:
∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM(µ′|vH)[vHq
M(µ′)− xM(µ′) + δ(1− qM(µ′)u∗H(µ
′)]
≥ max{0, ∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM(µ′|vL)[vHq
M(µ′)− xM(µ′) + δ(1− qM(µ′)u∗H(µ
′)]},
and
∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM(µ′|vL)[vLq
M(µ′)− xM(µ′)] ≥ max{0, ∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM(µ′|vH)[vLq
M(µ′)− xM(µ′)]}.
Denote the set of these mechanismsM0C.
43This prior will, of course, be an equilibrium object, but we suppress this from the notation to
keep things simple.
44Gerardi and Maestri (2018) use a similar trick to complete the worker’s strategy in their paper.
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1. Mechanisms not inM0C such that the buyer, when her type is vH, has no re-
porting strategy, ρ ∈ ∆(V), such that ∑v′ β
M(µ′|v′)ρ(v′)[vHq
M(µ′)− xM(µ′)] ≥
0; letM1C denote the set of these mechanisms.
2. Mechanisms not in M0C such that the buyer, when her type is vH, has a re-
porting strategy, ρ ∈ ∆(V), such that ∑v′ β
M(µ′|v′)ρ(v′)[vHq
M(µ′)− xM(µ′)] ≥
0, but not when her type is vL; letM
2
C denote the set of these mechanisms.
3. Mechanisms not inM0C such that both types have such a reporting strategy;
letM3C denote the set of these mechanisms.
If M ∈ M1C, specify that the buyer rejects the mechanism for both types. Hence,
under this strategy, the seller does not update his beliefs after observing a rejec-
tion. If, however, the buyer accepts, the seller believes v = vH . Note that, in this
case, continuation payoffs for the buyer are 0 from then on, regardless of her type.
For each type v, let r∗v(M, 1) denote an element of
45
arg max
ρ∈∆(V)
∑
v′∈V
ρ(v′) ∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM(µ′|v′)(vqM(µ′)− xM(µ′)).
If M ∈ M2C, specify that the buyer rejects when her type is vL. Hence, without
loss of generality, we can specify that if the seller observes that the buyer accepts
the mechanism, the buyer’s type is vH. For type vH, let r
∗
vH
(M, 1) satisfy that if
r∗vH(M, 1)(v) > 0, then
∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM(µ′|v)[vHq
M(µ′)− xM(µ′)] ≥ ∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM(µ′|v′)[vHq
M(µ′)− xM(µ′)]
for all v′ ∈ V. Note we are using that the buyer’s continuation payoffs are 0
conditional on her accepting the mechanism.
Then, vH’s payoff from participating in the mechanismM is given by
U1,vH(M) = ∑
v′∈V
r∗vH(M, 1)(v
′) ∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM(µ′|v′)[vHq
M(µ′)− xM(µ′) + δ(1− qM(µ′))× 0],
whereas the payoff from rejecting is
U0,vH(πvH , f ) = δ f (ν2(µ0,πvH)).
45Even if the buyer does not participate on the equilibrium path, we still need to guarantee the
reporting strategy is sequentially rational.
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where
ν2(µ0,πvH) =
µ0(1− πvH)
µ0(1− πvH) + 1− µ0
.
is the seller’s belief that the buyer is of type vH when observing a rejection, accord-
ing to Bayes’ rule, and f (ν2(µ0,πvH)) is ameasurable selection from U
∗
H(ν2(µ0,πvH)).
Note the payoff from rejecting is specified under the assumption that in the contin-
uation, the equilibrium path coincides with that of the intrapersonal equilibrium
when beliefs are ν2(µ0,πvH). We use, however, a selection from U
∗
H to ensure that
if needed, the seller randomizes between the posted prices when indifferent to
help make the buyer’s continuation problem well-behaved.
Now, (π∗vH (M), f
∗
2 (M)) are chosen so that
π∗vH ∈ arg max
p∈[0,1]
(1− p)U0,vH (π
∗
vH
, f ∗2 (M)) + pU1,vH(M)
The main result in Simon and Zame (1990) implies a solution to the above prob-
lem exists, given the properties of U ∗H and the linearity in p of the objective. Let
π∗vH(M) denote this fixed point. Now, if π
∗
vH
(M) < 1 and ν2(µ0,π
∗
vH
(M)) = µi for
some i ≥ 1, then there exists a weight φ2(µi,M) ∈ [0, 1] that solves the following:
f ∗2 (M, µi) = (1− φ)δ
i−1∆v+ φδi∆v. (E.1)
This weight captures the probability with which the seller, when his prior is µi,
mixes between γ∗(µi) and γ
∗(µi−1).
For a mechanism inM2C, let r
∗
vL
(M, 1) denote an element in
arg max
ρ∈∆(V)
∑
v′∈V
ρ(v′) ∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM(µ′|v′)(vLq
M(µ′)− xM(µ′)).
Finally, if M ∈ M3C, specify that the buyer accepts for both types. If the seller
observes that the buyer rejects the mechanism, he assigns probability 1 to the
buyer’s valuation being vH. Thus, upon rejection, continuation payoffs are 0 for
both types. Note that mechanisms inM3C satisfy the participation constraint given
the continuation values of the intrapersonal equilibrium. Now, let m∗L satisfy
46
∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM(µ′|m∗L)(vLq
M(µ′)− xM(µ′)) ≥ ∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM(µ′|v)(vLq
M(µ′)− xM(µ′)),
46We cannot ensure that truthtelling will hold for mechanisms in M3C, which is why we need
the extra piece of notation.
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for all v ∈ V. Set r∗vL(M, 1)(m
∗
L) = 1. Let {m
∗
H} = V \ {m
∗
L} and define
∆(V)H = {µ′ : βM(µ′|m∗H) > 0}
∆(V)L = {µ′ : βM(µ′|m∗L) > 0}.
Let µ0 denote the seller’s belief about the buyer’s valuation being vH. Let r ∈ [0, 1]
denote the weight the buyer assigns to m∗L when her valuation is vH:
ν3(µ0, µ
′, r, δm∗L) =


1 if µ′ ∈ ∆(V)H \ ∆(V)L
µ0(rβ
M(µ′|m∗L)+(1−r)β
M(µ′|m∗H))
µ0(rβM(µ′|m
∗
L)+(1−r)β
M(µ′|m∗H))+(1−µ0)β
M(µ′|m∗L)
if µ′ ∈ ∆(V)H ∩ ∆(V)L
µ0r
µ0r+(1−µ0)
if µ′ ∈ ∆(V)L \ ∆(V)H
,
where we assume that if the seller observes an output message that is not con-
sistent with m∗L, he believes it was generated by the high-valuation buyer. This
specification of beliefs does not conflict with Bayes’ rule where possible: either
m∗H has positive probability in the optimal reporting strategy of the buyer when
her valuation is vH, in which case, ν3 would be consistent with Bayes’ rule, or
it does not, in which case, Bayes’ rule where possible places no restrictions on
ν3(µ0, µ
′, ·) for µ′ ∈ ∆(V)H \ ∆(V)L.
Given ν3, the buyer when her valuation is vH obtains a payoff of
U1,vH(r,m, f ) = ∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM(µ′|m)(vHq
M(µ′)− xM(µ′) + δ(1− qM(µ′)) f (ν3(µ0, µ
′, r, δm∗L))),
when she reports m ∈ V, where f is a selection from U ∗H. We want to find
(r∗vH , f
∗
3 (M)) so that
r∗vH ∈ arg max
r∈[0,1]
rU1,vH(r
∗
vH
,m∗L, f
∗
3 (M)) + (1− r)U1,vH (r
∗
vH
,m∗H, f
∗
3 (M)). (E.2)
Again, we appeal to the result in Simon and Zame (1990) to argue that the proper-
ties of U ∗H and the objective function above imply the existence of such an (r
∗, f ∗3 (M)).
Set r∗vH (M, 1)(m
∗
L) = r
∗
vH
.
As we did before, whenever ν3(µ0, µ
′, r∗vH , δm∗L) = µi for i ≥ 1, we can define
φ3(M, µi) as the weight on γ
∗(µi) implied by f
∗
3 (M, µi).
Summing up, the buyer’s strategy at any history htB is given by
π∗v(h
t
B,M) =


1 ifM ∈ M0C ∪M
3
C
π∗vH(M) ifM ∈ M
2
C and v = vH
0 otherwise
(E.3)
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and
r∗v(h
t
B,M, 1) =
{
δv ifM ∈ M0C
r∗v(M, 1) otherwise
. (E.4)
E.2 Full specification of the PBE assessment
To complete the PBE assessment for G∞(µ0), we now specify the seller’s strategy
and the belief system. We introduce two pieces of notation: the first one allows us
to keep track of the last payoff-relevant event; the second one allows us to keep
track of how the seller’s beliefs evolve given the buyer’s strategy.
From the beginning of period t of the game until the end of that period, the
following things are determined: (i) the seller’s choice of mechanism, M; (ii) the
buyer’s participation decision, p ∈ (0, 1); and (iii) if the buyer participates of the
mechanism, the allocation and the output message. We let z∅(M) = (M, 0,∅, 0, 0)
to denote the outcome when mechanismM is chosen, the buyer does not partici-
pate, no output message is produced, and no trade and no transfers occur. We let
zq(M, µ′) = (M, 1, µ′, q, x) denote the outcome at the end of period t when mech-
anism M is chosen, the buyer participates (1), the output message is µ′, and the
allocation is (q, x). Of course, if q = 1, the game ends. Note that any public his-
tory ht can be written as (ht−1, z) for some z as defined above. Given ht, let z(ht)
denote the corresponding outcome z. Given any prior µ0, define
T(µ0, z) =


µ′ if z = zq(M, µ
′) andM ∈ M0C
1
if z = z∅(M) andM ∈ M
0
C ∪M
3
C
or
z = zq(M, µ
′) andM ∈ M1C ∪M
2
C
µ0 if z = z∅(M) andM ∈ M
1
C
ν2(µ0,π
∗
vH
(M)) if z = zq(M, µ′) andM ∈ M2C
ν3(µ0, µ
′, r∗vH(M, 1), r
∗
vL
(M, 1)) if z = zq(M, µ′) andM ∈ M3C
(E.5)
Let µ0 denote the seller’s prior in G
∞(µ0). Define µ
∗(∅) = µ0 and Γ
∗(∅) =
γ∗(µ0), where γ
∗ is the strategy in the intrapersonal equilibrium as defined in
Equation D.1. For any public history ht, define
µ∗(ht) = T(µ∗(ht−1), z(ht))). (E.6)
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If either (i) z = zq(M, ·) and M ∈ M
0
C ∪M
1
C ∪M
2
C, (ii) z = z∅(M), µ
∗(ht) /∈
{µi}i≥1 and M ∈ M
2
C, (iii) z = zq(M, ·), µ
∗(ht) /∈ {µi}i≥1 and M ∈ M
3
C, or (iv)
z = z∅(M) andM ∈ M
0
C ∪M
1
C ∪M
3
C, define
Γ∗(ht)(M) = 1[M = γ∗(T(µ∗(ht−1), z(ht))))]. (E.7)
If z(ht) = z∅(M, ·) forM ∈ M
2
C and µ
∗(ht) = µi, i ≥ 1, define
Γ∗(ht)(M) =


φ2(M, µi) M = γ
∗(µi)
1− φ2(M, µi) M = γ
∗(µi−1)
0 otherwise
. (E.8)
Finally, if z(ht) = zq(M, ·) forM ∈ M
3
C and µ
∗(ht) = µi, i ≥ 1, define
Γ∗(ht)(M) =


φ3(M, µi) M = γ
∗(µi)
1− φ3(M, µi) M = γ
∗(µi−1)
0 otherwise
. (E.9)
Equations E.3-E.4, together with equations E.6- E.9, define a PBE assessment
where the system of beliefs is derived from the strategy profile where possible.
E.3 Seller’s and buyer’s sequential rationality
We now check that at all histories, neither the seller nor the buyer have a one-
shot deviation from the prescribed strategy profile, given the continuation values
for the seller and the buyer constructed using the intrapersonal equilibrium. This
implies that the payoffs in the intrapersonal equilibrium together with the belief
operator defined in Equation E.5 belong in the self-generating set. Appendix I in
Doval and Skreta (2019) lays out the formalisms that justify the use of techniques
a´ la Abreu et al. (1990) for the game under consideration.
Let µ∗(ht) denote the seller’s belief at history ht that the buyer’s type is vH . We
now show the seller cannot achieve a payoff higher than R(τ
∗,q∗)(µ∗(ht), µ∗(ht)).
Note that among mechanisms of type 0, the one that corresponds to the intrap-
ersonal equilibrium is, by definition, the best that the seller can do. Hence, to
show that there are no deviations, we need to show the seller cannot benefit from
offering mechanisms of types 1-3.
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Given the buyer’s strategy, the payoff from offering a mechanism in M1C is
δR(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µ∗(ht), µ∗(ht)) ≤ R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µ∗(ht), µ∗(ht)), and hence this deviation is not
profitable. Let M denote a mechanism in M2C and let π
∗
vH
(htB,M), r
∗
vH
(htB,M, 1)
denote the buyer’s best responses as constructed in Section E.1. Denote by ν2 ≡
ν2(µ
∗(ht),π∗vH(h
t
B,M)) the seller’s belief that he is facing a buyer with valuation
vH when he observes non-participation. The seller’s payoff is then
µ∗(ht)π∗vH (h
t
B,M) ∑
µ′∈∆(V)
(
∑
v∈V
βM(µ′|v)r∗vH (h
t
B,M, 1)(v)
)
[xM(µ′) + δ(1− qM(µ′))vH ]
+ (1− µ∗(ht)π∗vH (h
t
B,M))R
(τ∗ ,q∗)(ν2, ν2)), (E.10)
where the continuation values after rejection are constructed using the policy from
the intrapersonal equilibrium once the seller has posterior ν2(µ
∗(ht),π∗vH(h
t
B,M)).
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Now, consider the following alternative mechanism,M′:
βM
′
(1|vH) = π
∗
vH
(M) ∑
v∈V,µ′∈∆(V)
βM(µ′|v)r∗vH (M)(v)
βM
′
(ν2|vH) = (1− π
∗
vH
(M))
βM
′
(ν2|vL) = 1
qM
′
(ν2) = x
M′(ν2) = 0
xM
′
(1) = ∑
v∈V
∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM(µ′|v)r∗vH (M)(v)x
M(µ′)
qM
′
(1) = ∑
v∈V
∑
µ′∈∆(V)
βM(µ′|v)r∗vH (M)(v)q
M(µ′)
Note that if the buyer participates and truthfully reports her type, M′ gives the
seller a payoff equal to the expression in Equation E.10. Moreover, participating
and truthfully reporting her type is a best response for the buyer. Then, we can
write the payoff to mechanism,M′, as
∑
µ′∈{ν2,1}
τM
′
(µ∗(ht), µ′)[xM
′
(µ′) + δ(1− qM
′
(µ′))R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µ′, µ′)],
where, as in the main text,
τM
′
(µ∗(ht), µ′) = ∑
v∈V
µ∗(ht)(v)βM
′
(µ′|v).
47To keep notation simple, we do not use that the seller in the continuation may randomize in
his choice.
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Now, truthtelling implies xM
′
(1) ≤ vHq
M′(1)− δu∗H(µ
′(π∗vH (M))), so that
∑
µ′∈{ν2,1}
τM
′
(µ∗(ht), µ′)[xM
′
(µ′) + δ(1− qM
′
(µ′))R(τ
∗,q∗)(µ′, µ′)]
≤ ∑
µ′∈{ν2,1}
τM
′
(µ∗(ht), µ′)
{
qM
′
(µ′)(µ′vH + (1− µ
′)vˆL(µ
∗(ht)))
+δ(1− qM
′
(µ′))
[
R(τ
∗,q∗)(µ′, µ′) + (1− µ′)(
µ′
1− µ′
−
µ∗(ht)
1− µ∗(ht)
)u∗H(µ
′)
]}
,
which, by definition, is weakly lower than R(τ
∗ ,q∗)(µ∗(ht), µ∗(ht)).
Similar steps imply the seller does not have a one-shot deviation to amechanism
of type 3.
Finally, note the construction of π∗v , r
∗
v in Section E.1 (Equations E.3 and E.4)
ensures the buyer is best responding after every history given the continuation
values.
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